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I. INTRODUCTION
Commencing with its 1983 decision in Virginia D. v. Madesco Investment
Corp.,' a pro-plaintiff bias is thought to have overtaken the Missouri Su-
preme Court.2 For example, subsequent supreme court cases have introduced
1. 648 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (jury could find that evidence of
past, nonviolent, criminal incidents was sufficient to impose duty upon hotel to take
reasonable precautions to guard against sexual assault on guest).
2. Different people no doubt will trace this perceived swing from different
dates. For example, in Bass v. Nooney, 646 S.W.2d 765 (Mo. 1983) (en banc), the
Missouri Supreme Court abandoned the impact rule which limited recovery for emo-
tional distress and permitted plaintiff to recover provided that defendant should have
realized that its conduct could unreasonably cause distress and that the emotional
distress is medically diagnosable. This case was submitted to the court prior to the
appointment of Judges Blackmar and Billings. However, the choice of Virginia D.
seems appropriate. Subsequent Missouri Supreme Court opinions themselves have
referred back, often scathingly, to the Virginia D. case. See, e.g., Johnson v. Pacific
Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237, 246 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (Donnelly,
J., dissenting); Fowler v. Park Corp., 673 S.W.2d 749, 761 (Mo. 1984) (en banc)
(Donnelly, J., dissenting); Jackson v. Ray Kruse Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 664, 671
(Mo. 1986) (en banc) (Donnelly, J., dissenting); Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715
S.W.2d 491, 497 n.1 (Mo. 1986) (en band) (Donnelly, J., dissenting). Also, and of
considerable importance, Virginia D. was the first personal injury torts opinion writ-
ten by the then newly appointed member of the court, Judge Charles B. Blackmar.
Note, incidentally but importantly in the context of the subject matter of this
article, that Judge Donnelly was the author of the court's opinion in Missouri's first
modern products liability case, Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362
(Mo. 1969). More recent opinions of the majority have been penned by Judge Black-
mar and Judge Billings. However, when the issue is whether to extend products
liability law into uncharted waters, very different allegiances can develop. See, e.g.,
Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901
(Mo. 1986) (en banc) (Donnelly, J., for the majority with Welliver and Blackmar,
J.J., concurring and Blackmar, J., concurring in the separate concurring opinion of
Welliver, J.; Billings and Rendlen, J.J., concurring in dissenting opinion of Higgins,
C.J.).
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an extended notion of vicarious liability3 and, taking on where Virginia D.
left off, have imposed still further burdens upon property owners.
4
Recent products liability decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court sug-
gest that this trend, detectible in the court's general torts decisions,5 may
have found application in the law controlling manufacturer responsibility for
defective products.
Persistent dissenters from these torts cases also have distanced themselves
from recent and important developments of products liability doctrine. 6 These
dissenting voices have accused a majority on the supreme court of instituting
a system of absolute liability. Judge Donnelly, one of those voices, has stated
that: "In early 1983 it was apparent that fault was targeted for elimination
as a component in the tort equation. This is unfortunate. In my view, the
Court distorts the judicial process when it gives to one what belongs to
another. ' 7 Judge Donnelly has gone so far as to suggest in the face of this
assault that the core doctrine of strict products liability should be abrogated."
3. Johnson v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d 237 (Mo.
1983) (en banc) (freight broker and carrier vicariously liable for negligence of truck
driver despite fact that the only link between the two was a leased sign indicating an
agency relationship, present on the truck, the removal of the sign having been for-
gotten).
4. Jackson v. Ray Kruse Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. 1986) (negligent
failure of apartment complex to install speed bumps was the proximate cause of
injuries sustained by child hit by bicycle in parking lot). See also Frank v. Environ-
mental Sanitation Management, 687 S.W.2d 876 (Mo. 1985).
5. The debate in the Missouri Supreme Court has not always been in cases
that have extended plaintiff recovery. For example, in State ex rel. St. Louis Housing
Auth. v. Gaertner, 695 S.W.2d 460 (Mo. 1985) (en banc), Judge Donnelly's majority
opinion held that a housing authority was shielded from tort liability by the doctrine
of sovereign immunity. This solicited the response from Judge Blackmar (Rendlen,
J., and Lowenstein, S.J., concurring) that: "The principal opinion, through a surfeit
of conceptualistic analysis, unnecessarily deprives the plaintiffs in the trial court of
insurance coverage which the relator undertook to furnish." Id. at 463 (Blackmer,
J. dissenting).
6. In both Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc), and Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc),
Judges Welliver and Donnelly dissented and filed separate opinions.
7. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., Inc., 715 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc) (footnote omitted).
8. Barnes v. Tools and Mach. Builders, 715 S.W.2d 518, 524 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc) (Donnelly, J., dissenting).
I think it must be said now that Keener [Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co.,
445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969), introducing strict products liability into Missouri
law] is a failed attempt at fairness. Given its ultimate distortion by the
holding in Lippard [discussed infra textoaccompanying note 167], Keener
should be expressly overruled.
Id.
Judge Welliver, also a frequent dissenter in recent products liability cases,
does not appear to be quite so disenchanted with the basics of the strict liability
1987]
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Yet at the same time, the Missouri Supreme Court has clouded its message9
somewhat by refusing to increase product manufacturer liability in other
important areas. 0 It appears that there is a narrow majority on the supreme
court that favors permitting most of what it considers mainstream products
liability claims to go to the jury with a minimum of judicial control." How-
ever, that majority disintegrates when there is a proposal for what some
members of the court would consider to be a change in, rather than a mere
application of, accepted principles.'2
The purpose of this article is to detail the recent developments in Mis-
souri's law of products liability and to highlight any detectible trends. 3 Spe-
cifically, investigation will be made of the allegations that the Missouri Supreme
Court is displaying a pronounced pro-plaintiff shift.14 Clearly, the existence
system. See Sharp Bros. Contracing Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703
S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. 1986) (Welliver, J., concurring):
The architects of [strict liability] ... recognized the need to allow injured
consumers or remote parties the ability to sue suppliers, sellers or manu-
facturers absent the technical requirements of privity in a contract action or
without the need to prove negligence in a tort action. The rationale for such
a doctrine was that consumers and remote parties are not on an equal footing
with the manufacturer or seller to bargain effectively for the allocation of
risk.
Id.
9. Missouri is not alone in sending out the occasional mixed message. See,
e.g., Levy & Ursin, Tort Law in California: At the Crossroads, 67 CALI. L. REv.
497, 497-98 (1979).
10. See, e.g., Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co.; 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (en bane)
(Missouri will not recognize "market share" exception to plaintiff's burden of iden-
tifying product manufacturer); Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist &
Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986) (en bane) (strict liability does not apply
where the only harm is to the product itself, abandoning previous ["violent occur-
rence" rule]); Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986) (successor corporation not liable on the so-called "product-line" theory).
11. And, possibly, a minimum of defense evidence as to the safety of the
product.
12. See cases cited supra notes 2 and 10. Specifically, consider the reference
to doctrine that "substantially alters the existing rights and liabilities of the litigants."
Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241, 247 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
13. This article is restricted in its scope to an examination of those issues that
have arisen because of Missouri's adoption of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
402A (1965). It does not deal with allegations brought under warranty or negligence
theories. Neither does it address the peripheral causes of action to be found in
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 402B (1965), Heitman v. Concrete Mach. Co.,
Order No. 82-2008C(i) (Mo. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 1983) (on file with the Missouri Law
Review) (section 402B not recognized gs part of the law of Missouri), nor the some-
what idiosyncratic negligence cause of action recognized in Missouri for furnishing
a dangerous instrumentality. See Mo. APPROVED JURY INSTRUCTIONS 25.06 (1981)
[hereinafter MAI].
14. The torts system, generally, is being subjected to unprecedented criticism.
[Vol. 52
4
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/7
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
of any such shift will be of profound importance at the time when Missouri
is still feeling the effects of the so-called insurance "crisis"" and when its
courts will be interpreting newly introduced products liability "reform" leg-
islation.1 6
II. AN ABRIDGED HISTORY OF LAw AND POLICY
In 1969, the Missouri Supreme Court in Keener v. Dayton Electric Mfg.,
Co., moved Missouri products law into the mainstream postulating that, inter
alia, "[iut is essential now that the Bench and Bar of Missouri be given some
sense of direction in products liability cases."117 It is ironic that the supreme
court should have ignored its avowed purpose for fifteen years following
that opinion."I
Notwithstanding the period of neglect that would follow, Keener placed
Missouri in alignment with the majority of jurisdictions in adopting the
formulation of liability to be found in the Second Restatement of Torts,
Section 402A.19 In short, whether alleging a manufacturing (quality control)
See O'Connell, Bhopal, the Good Lawyer, and the American Law School: A Torts
(and Insurance) Professor's Perspective, 36 J. LEGAL EDuc. 311, 311 (1986):
[O]ur personal injury tort system is a very sorry one - bloated, arbitrary,
and dilatory. [I]t seems to me to fail abysmally at every level on which it
operates and at every goal at which it aims. As to its achieving deterrence,
we are told that sanctions must be swift and certain - two things tort law
is certainly not. As to providing compensation, many plaintiffs are not paid
or paid much less than their loss, some are paid much more than their loss,
and any payment is long delayed. As to efficiency, the system entails huge
transaction costs in insurance overhead and legal fees for plaintiff and
defendant alike. The result is both bad law and a bad insurance system.
Id. (citation omitted).
15. If, indeed, any crisis existed. See, e.g., Terry, The Malpractice Crisis in
the United States: A Dispatch from the Trenches, 2 PROF. NEGL. 145 (1986).
16. See generally H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (1987).
17. 445 S.W.2d 362, 364 (Mo. 1969). Previously, the supreme court had ap-
proved a strict liability system based on implied warranty doctrine. See Morrow v.
Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963) (en banc).
18. For a brief history of Missouri products liability law, see Nesselrode v.
Executive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 375-78 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
19. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) [hereinafter RESTATE-
MENT] states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for
physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his
property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product,
and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without
substantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
19871
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defect,20 a design defect 2' or a marketing (warning) defect,22 the plaintiff in
a Missouri products liability action must prove that the product in question
was "unreasonably dangerous"' ' for its reasonably anticipated (or foresee-
able) use.u Furthermore, and in keeping with most jurisdictions, the Missouri
courts have not been reticent in extending the reach of strict liability to most
of the parties involved in the chain of distribution.2
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and
sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or
entered into any contractual relation with the seller.
20. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
21. Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977); Duke v. Gulf
& W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 411-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); cf H.B. 700, 84th
Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 33(3)(a) (1987) (treating manufacturing and design defects
as a single type of allegation).
22. Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984); Duke, 660
S.W.2d 404 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); see also H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess.,
§ 33(b) (1987).
23. In manufacturing and design defect cases, plaintiff must prove that the
product was in a "defective condition unreasonably dangerous." See generally MAI
25.04, Strict Liability - Product Defect:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, the defendant sold the (describe product) in the course of defendant's
business, and
Second, the (describe product) was then in a defective condition unreason-
ably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use, and
Third, the (describe product) was used in a manner reasonably anticipated,
and
Fourth, plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of such defective condition
as existed when the (describe product) was sold.
However, in a marketing defect case, the defective condition requirement is
omitted. See MAI 25.05, Strict Liability- Failure to Warn:
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, defendant sold the (describe product) in the course of defendant's
business, and
Second, the (describe product) was then unreasonably dangerous when put
to a reasonably anticipated use without knowledge of its characteristics, and
Third, defendant did not give an adequate warning of the danger, and
Fourth, the product was used in a manner reasonably anticipated, and
Fifth, plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of the (describe product) being
sold without an adequate warning.
For a discussion of whether Missouri has adopted a bifurcated test, see infra,
text accompanying note 89.
24. See, e.g., Klein v. General Elec. Co., 714 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986).
25. See, e.g., Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 494 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. Ct. App.
1973); Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, 565 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); cf.
Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1984); Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d
387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Chubb Group of Ins. Co. v. C.F. Murphy & Assocs., Inc.,
[Vol. 52
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At the root of the doctrinal and policy difficulties experienced by the
courts, including Missouri's, are the seldom appreciated limitations of prod-
uct liability's doctrinal base, 26 the Restatement (Second) of Torts, Section
402A. 27 Arguably, section 402A was designed to deal only with manufacturing
defects, not design or warning cases.2 Its founding fathers probably had in
mind no more than a streamlining and consolidation of existing doctrinal
approaches such as negligence plus res ipsa loquitur,29 and warranty minus
privity" theories. The purpose was not to bring in any dramatic change, but
656 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Hunt v. Guarantee Elec. Co., 667 S.W.2d 9(Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Gunderson v. Sani-Kem Corp., 674 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984); Commercial Distrib. Center v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985).
H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 33(l) (1987) provides in its
definition of a products liability action for no differentiation between defendants
"wherever situated in the stream of commerce." However, section 34 provides that:
1. A defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as a seller in
the stream of commerce may be dismissed from a products liability claim
as provided in this section.
2. This section shall apply to any products liability claim in which another
defendant, including the manufacturer, is properly before the court and from
whom total recovery may be had for plaintiff's claim.
Id. Section 34(3)-(7) provides for procedural devices to reflect this new substantive
rule. Id. § 34(3)-(7). The purpose of this new rule is to reduce the litigation costs of
retailers (or other mere conduits) who routinely are joined as co-defendants in prod-
ucts liability cases brought against manufacturers. Because of the provisions of section
34(2), (4)-(7) plaintiffs should suffer no adverse effects with regard to their damage
recovery. Nevertheless, this provision underestimates the role of such sellers in modern
marketing. First, in many industries, sellers, particularly retailers, play an important
role as the marketing arms of manufacturers. In such cases considerable difficulty
will be experienced by the courts in determining whether such a seller's alleged liability
is based "solely on his status as a seller." In this regard, section 34(4) invites plaintiffs
to indulge in a fishing expedition to attempt to discover some nonseller basis for
liability. Second, the new provision ignores the important accident avoidance role
that even "mere" sellers may have because of their superior bargaining position with
the manufacturer when compared to the consumer. Third, such sellers are already in
a position to negotiate with manufacturers for indemnification for their litigation
costs and liability exposure.
26. Cf. Little, Rationalization of the Law of Product Liability, 36 U. FLA.
L. Ruv. 1 (1984) (tracing the problems back into the nineteenth century).
27. RESTATEMENT, supra, note 19.
28. Not surprisingly, it is only the first type of case that seems to escape the
difficulties addressed in this article. This is because, in a manufacturing defect case,
there is little difficulty in determining the degree of quality that the product in question
should have possessed. A simple comparison with products from the same production
line that do not contain such a defect provides an unimpeachable standard of ref-
erence.
29. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d
436 (1944).
30. See Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
1987]
7
Terry: Terry: Stricter Products Liability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1987
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
to reduce the plaintiff's administrative costs in pressing her case.3' If the
change in doctrine had the effect of redistributing a few more of those
product-related risks, that would not be out of keeping with the rise of
consumer protectionism at the time that section 402A was being drafted.
Yet the true distributional role of section 402A was never made clear. 32
Since its inception at least two radically contrasting views have been main-
tainable. In the first place, section 402A may be read as having introduced
a species of "super-negligence." This type of products liability system would
work much like any other modern personal injury tort, aside from a "few"
modifications of the general tort rules and a "few" restrictions going to
evidentiary matters. If this really was the case, then the courts have been
needlessly cryptic in their analysis of products cases. Furthermore, if modern
products liability is merely this "super-negligence" system, then perhaps its
administrators, the courts, mistakenly are using it to redistribute too many
risks.
A second possible interpretation of section 402A is that it constitutes a
reasonably pure attempt by the judiciary to shift nearly all product-related
risks away from those in the chain of consumption.33 If this is the case,
neither the insurance or manufacturing industries nor their defense counsel
have ever come to terms with this purpose of modern products liability law.
Further, the courts have failed to come up with a doctrinal statement that
expresses this intent34 or one which will achieve such redistribution with
dramatically lowered administrative costs. Finally, as a society, we do not
Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel, 50 MINN. L. REv. 791 (1966); see also Comment,
Implied Warranties - The Privity Rule and Strict Liability - The Non-Food Cases,
27 Mo. L. Rev. 194 (1962).
31. By reducing the number of issues requiring proof, rather than requiring
plaintiff to establish a large number of doctrinal requirements, but subjecting their
proof to a burden shift with a res ipsa loquitur instruction, strict liability actually
reduces the number of elements that need to be proven. See, e.g., Blevins v. Cushman
Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Mo. 1977) (en banc) (stating that, "[olur acceptance
of strict liability in tort in defective design cases 'eliminates proof as to violation of
the standard of reasonable care' with regard to the adoption of a particular product
design") (citation omitted). Compare for example the plaintiff's burden in a negli-
gence case. See, e.g., Bean v. Ross Mfg., 344 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1961).
32. See Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of
Litigation, 54 Tex. L. REv. 1185, 1187 (1976).
33. See, e.g., Frank v. Environmental Sanitation Management, 687 S.W.2d
876, 885 (Mo. 1985) (Blackmar, J., concurring). For an example of the difficulties
inherent in this approach, see Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981). See also Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp.,
484 So. 2d 110, 114 (La. 1986) (possibly describing a more radical form of strict
liability to be applied to redistribute the risks associated with certain products).
34. This issue displays particularly egregious examples of judicial doubletalk.
Consider, for example, two passages from Judge Billings' generally exemplary ma-
jority opinion in Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc). Of greatest importance was his provision of a modern focus for Missouri's
[Vol. 52
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seem to have faced up to the problem of whether there should be some quid
pro quo for this type of risk redistribution. 5
For Missouri, like most other 402A states, the Restatement formulation
has remained the holy grail of its products liability law. Thus, the disposition
of every products issue apparently must commence with an incantation to
the effect that:
Missouri products liability has its origin in Keener v. Dayton Manufac-
turing Co., Inc. This case followed the lead of Restatement (Second) of
Torts, section 402A, which states emphatically that liability may be found
if a person is injured by a defective product unreasonably dangerous, even
though the manufacturer or supplier has taken all possible precautions.',
Unfortunately, neither such recitations nor section 402A have told us
very much about the nature of this form of liability. Functionally, we can
presume that the drafters had determined that negligence-based liability either
was not redistributing enough product related risks3 7 or that any such redis-
products liability law stating:
The imposition of strict tort liability is justified on the grounds that the
manufacturer or seller is almost always better equipped than the consumer
to endure the economic consequences of accidents caused by defective prod-
ucts. Everything in the marketplace has a price, including profits. Economic
responsibility for the debilitating consequences of injuries caused by defective
products is but one of the many associated with doing business and earning
profits. All things considered, we find no unfairness in holding manufac-
turers and sellers economically and socially responsible for injuries actually
caused by the products they place for profit in the stream of commerce.
Id. at 383. However, earlier in his opinion, Judge Billings had stated that,"the doc-
trine of strict tort liability is not, nor was it ever intended to be, an enveloping net
of absolute liability." Id. at 375. The problem is that many would define an absolute
liability system as one based solely on causation; a system which Judge Billings' later
statement appeared to delineate.
35. For example, taking more of a worker's compensation or no-fault insur-
ance oriented approach to the amount of damages recoverable under such a system.
36. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
(citation omitted).
37. Such may be gauged from the court's opinion in Keener v. Dayton Mfg.
Co., Inc., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969), relying as it did on the type of risk redistribution
adopted in California. Id. at 364; see also Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707
S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc):
Strict tort liability recognizes that in today's world consumers can do little
to protect themselves from the risk of serious injury caused by defects in
the products they purchase. And, the more complex the product, the less
opportunity there is for the consumer to guard against deleterious defects.
To this extent, the consumer must rely upon the integrity and competency
of the business community. History, however, has taught us that negligence
liability alone provides an inadequate tort remedy for injured consumers
and does little to stimulate greater care in the manufacturing process. Strict
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tribution was costing too much in terms of plaintiffs' administrative or in-
formation costs.
Section 402A, itself, yields some useful, albeit basic, information when
it states that liability applies even though "the seller has exercised all possible
care in the preparation and sale of his product.'"'3 We know, therefore, that
we will be redistributing more risks than under the preceeding negligence-
based system.3 9 Further, the general labelling of this new type of liability as
"strict" suggests that it is not an absolute liability system, i.e., liability of
a product supplier based solely on causation. 40 Thus, it has been stated that,
"[a]lthough the doctrine of strict liability in tort imposes liability without
proof of negligence, the law does not impose liability for every injury caused
by a product. Liability exists only if the product was in a 'defective condition
unreasonably dangerous.' ,,41
A stronger conceptual and doctrinal base has been suggested for at least
two reasons. First, to distinguish this new form of liability from the negli-
gence based system that preceded it. Second, to provide some formula for
distinguishing those product-related risks that the court does wish to redis-
tribute and those that it does not.42 Overall, however, surprisingly little about
these issues is revealed from the system's doctrinal underpinnings.
43
38. RE STATEMENT, supra note 19, § 402A(2)(a).
39. We also learn something as to the "quality" of our redistribution system;
it is one based upon tort not contract. See Keener, 445 S.W.2d at 364 ("The main
advantage to Missouri courts in fully adopting the Restatement theory could be release
from the shackles of warranty language .... ." (quoting Krauskopf, Products Lia-
bility, 32 Mo. L. REv. 459, 469 (1967)).
40. Consider for example the workers' compensation systems that we know
today. In essence, such statutes circumvent the tort redistribution system and many
of its failings by limiting the employer liability and employee recovery for work-
related injuries. The employer is held to a strict liability standard for accidental
injuries arising out of and during the course of employment. As a quid pro quo for
such heightened liability, the employee can no longer recover in tort for such injuries.
Compensation generally is limited to medical treatment costs and lost earning ca-
pacity.
41. See, e.g., Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 147 Ariz. 242, -, 709 P.2d 876, 878
(1985) (citation omitted); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, -, 463 A.2d 298,
303 (1983).
42. For a dramatization of this issue, see Crowe, Products Liability Law-A
Brief Reflection on Legal Analysis and an Aspect of the Concept of Defect, 34
MERCER L. REv. 955, 957-61 (1983). For an effective summary of the various ap-
proaches to distinguishing those risks to be redistributed that have been proposed
and/or adopted, see Vandall, "Design Defect" in Products Liability: Rethinking
Negligence and Strict Liability, 43 OHao STATE L.J. 61, 72-79 (1982).
43. By way of comparison, consider REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF ToRTs §§ 519-
20 (1977) providing that:
§ 519. General Principle
(1) One who carries on an abnormally dangerous activity is subject to
liability for harm to the person, land or chattels of another resulting from
[Vol. 52
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Courts and commentators have responded by seeking to fill this vacuum
with reverse-engineered doctrine.M "[D]efective condition unreasonably dan-
the activity, although he has exercised the utmost care to prevent the harm.
(2) This strict liability is limited to the kind of harm, the possibility of
which makes the activity abnormally dangerous.
§ 520. Abnormally Dangerous Activities
In determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous, the following
factors are to be considered:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dan-
gerous attributes.
Id. §§ 519-20.
Sections 519-20 espouse a very different judicial philosophy. Whereas section
519 is as vague as components of section 402A, section 520 provides both limiting
factors and criteria to assist the doctrine's application. For Missouri cases applying
these principles, see Summers v. Tavern Rock Sand Co., 315 S.W.2d 201 (Mo. 1958);
Donnell v. Vigus Quarries, 526 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (strict liability for
blasting damage).
44. Unlike the case with section 402A, the judiciary was supplied with suf-
ficient means to exert continued and tight doctrinal control over the types of cases
that fall under RESrATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS §§ 519-20 (1977). See, § 520 comment
f, defining "[a]bnormally dangerous,"
For an activity to be abnormally dangerous, not only must it create a danger
of physical harm to others but the danger must be an abnormal one. In
general, abnormal dangers arise from activities that are in themselves unusual,
or from unusual risks created by more usual activities under particular cir-
cumstances. In determining whether the danger is abnormal, the factors listed
in clauses (a) to (f) of this Section [supra note 43] are all to be considered,
and are all of importance. Any one of them is not necessarily sufficient of
itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be required
for strict liability. On the other hand, it is not necessary that each of them
be present, especially if others weigh heavily. Because of the interplay of
these various factors, it is not possible to reduce abnormally dangerous
activities to any definition. The essential question is whether the risk created
is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances
surrounding it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm
that results from it, even though it is carried on with all reasonable care.
In other words, are its dangers and appropriateness for the locality so great
that, despite any usefulness it may have for the community, it should be
required as a matter of law to pay for any harm it causes, without the need
of a finding of negligence.
Id.
It should be remembered that there was initial judicial antipathy toward the
antecedents of sections 519-20, Rylands v. Fletcher, L.R. 3 H.L. 330 (1868), aff'g,
Fletcher v. Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866). See Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442 (1873).
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gerous, ' 41 the only phrase in the Restatement formulation which did not
have an immediately obvious natural meaning, was seized upon as the best
available Trojan Horse which could carry some structured system into the
new citadel of strict liability.
The most popular method of distinguishing between negligence and strict
products liability is the "foresight of risk" approach, whereby that com-
ponent of negligent products liability" is summarily deleted from the strict
liability formulation.4 7 In Blevins v. Cushman Motors, the Supreme Court
of Missouri stated:
[There exists an important distinction between [negligence and strict li-
ability]. In negligence cases the duty owed is based on the foreseeable "or
reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is a likely result of acts or
omissions." On the other hand, strict liability in tort is based in part on
the foreseeable or "reasonably anticipated" use of the "product, rather
than on the reasonably anticipated harm the product may cause.4 8
Subsequent Missouri cases have endorsed this choice of doctrinal distinc-
tion.49
Perhaps such antipathy or, even, hostility has been channelled into a degree of con-
servatism in the application of the modem doctrine. See generally Comment, The
Rylands v. Fletcher Doctrine and Its Standing in Missouri, 18 Mo. L. REv. 53 (1953).
To further emphasize the role of the judiciary in keeping the doctrinal reins
on the doctrine, consider, REsTA=Tr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 comment 1 (1977),
stating that it is the function of the court and not the jury to determine the necessity
for the imposition of strict liability.
45. RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 402A(1).
46. See RESTATEiENT, supra note 19, § 395.
47. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491-94, 525 P.2d 1033,
1036-37 (1974) (en banc). See generally Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973). Arguably, this approach was considered to
have more important practical rather than theoretical implications until the New
Jersey Supreme Court applied this approach to marketing cases and thus triggered
the "state of the art" debate. See infra text accompanying note 143.
48. 551 S.W.2d 602, 607-08 (Mo. 1977) (en banc) (citation omitted).
49. See Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 n.4 (Mo.
1986) (en banc) ("[floreseeability... is a determinant of use: it is not a determinant
of harm); Aronson's Men's Stores v. Potter Elec. Signal, 632 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. 1982)
(en banc); Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911, 917 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985); Chubb Group of Ins. Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766,
775 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (recognizing that both strict and negligence liability imposed
duties not to manufacture so as to be unreasonably dangerous; suggesting, therefore,
that the difference must lie elsewhere); Keller v. International Harvester Corp., 648
S.W.2d 584, 587 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See generally White v. General Chem. Co.,
136 S.W.2d 345, 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940) (in negligence-based products liability
action plaintiff has burden of showing that the defendant knew or should have known
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Additionally, the Missouri courts have adopted another significant in-
dicia of a strict liability system by shifting their judgmental emphasis from
the manufacturer to its product.50 This approach is designed to replace the
negligence "reasonable manufacturer" test with more objective criteria. In
their extreme manifestations these approaches lead to the exclusion of certain
evidence and initiate the so-called "state of the art" debate.5'
Most of the observed battles in modern products litigation continue to
confront and occasionally address these fundamental issues, albeit under the
guise of some manipulatable piece of judicial labelling.5 2 Should a risk-benefit
analysis or a consumer expectations test be utilized?5 a What degree of product
misuse is foreseeable? Should a defendant be permitted to introduce state of
the art evidence? When assessing the "unreasonableness" of the danger of
a product should a hindsight or a foresight test be applied?
Given these and other dilemmas faced by contemporary products law,
it is tempting to reach back to the words of Judge Molloy penned in 1967:
The grand simplicity of the new doctrine-its sweeping aside of the concept
of liability through fault-is its most dangerous aspect. The all-inclusive
ring of "strict liability," will cause an overextension . .. of what is con-
ceived by its progenitors to be a limited concept. Unlike its predecessor-
doctrine of liability through "fault," which in the very statement of the
principle suggests that the shifting of loss is to be the exception rather
than the rule, the innuendos of the new verbiage are pervasive.Y
The flaw inherent in this otherwise perceptive comment was, and indeed
is, that this criticism may also be levelled at the negligence system. Negligence
law is similarly open ended. This state of affairs became inevitable once the
courts abandoned a standard of care that, either directly- or indirectly,5 6
judged the defendant by a subjective standard.
50. See, e.g., Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 608 (Mo. 1977)
(en banc); Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 395 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied
and appeal dismissed sub nom. Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982).
51. See, e.g., Peterson v. Auto Wash Mfg. & Supply Co., 676 F.2d 949, 953
(8th Cir. 1982); Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir.
1973); Keller v. International Harvester Corp., 648 S.W.2d 584, 588 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983). See also infra text accompanying note 141.
52. See generally Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Ap-
proach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809 (1935).
53. For the prevailing attitudes prior to Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co.,
445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969) (en banc), see Krauskopf, Products Liability, 33 Mo. L.
REv. 24, 33-36 (1968).
54. Bailey v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 6 Ariz. App. 213, 224, 431 P.2d 108,
119 (1967) (Molloy, J., dissenting).
55. See Vaughan v. Menlove, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837) (refusal to permit
totally subjective standard to be utilized in law of negligence).
56. See The T.J. Hooper, 60 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1932) (denying any conclusive
role for customary practices in setting the legal standard of care for an industry).
1987]
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TIE BASES OF STRICT LLArnurY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
Missouri's development of products liability law in the years that fol-
lowed Keener" followed a somewhat conservative course, heavily dependent
on section 402A. As such it was considered that Missouri preferred the
conventional route to determining whether a product was "unreasonably
dangerous;" the Restatement's so-called "consumer expectations" (or con-
sumer contemplation) test." However, absent any firm statement to this effect
by the supreme court,5 9 the Western District Court of Appeals, has been
somewhat more adventurous. 60
The conventional "consumer expectations" 61 approach is seriously
flawed. 62 In the first place, courts will not apply it literally and ask the jury
(consumers) what their expectatiohs would have been.63 Secondly, the "con-
sumer" appaently used in this test either is nonidentifiable or the subject
of judicial manipulation." The explanation appears to be that despite the
57. 445 S.W.2d 362.
58. In fact, as noted by the Missouri Supreme Court in Nesselrode v. Executive
Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 377 n.10 (Mo. 1986) (en banc), only a "handful" of
cases have mentioned the test. See, e.g., St. Louis-S.F. Ry. v. Armco Steel Corp.,
359 F. Supp. 760, 762 (E.D. Mo. 1973), aff'd in part, 490 F.2d 367 (8th Cir. 1974);
Uder v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 668 S.W.2d 82, 93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Racer v.
Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied and appeal dismissed
sub noma. Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982); Brawner v. Liberty
Indus., 573 S.W.2d 376 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); see also Hylton v. John Deere Co.,
802 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir. 1986).
59. The closest that the Missouri Supreme Court came to adopting a position
was in Aronson's Men's Stores v. Potter Elec. Signal Co., 632 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Mo.
1982) (en banc).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 69-70.
61. An apparently close relative is the "manufacturer's expectations" test.
See Dorsey v., Yoder Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d
1339 (3d. Cir. 1973); Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 494, 525 P.2d
1033, 1037 (1974) (en banc). Courts and commentators insist that this test should be
interpreted as a variant on the "consumer expectations" formulation. However, as
with the "risk-utility" test, discussed infra text beginning at note 68, the jury is asked,
"if you were in the shoes of a reasonable manufacturer and there was a cost-effective
alternative design to the one in question, would you have considered this product to-
be unreasonably dangerous?" Furthermore, a consumer's expectations will only equate
to a manufacturer's in cases involving manufacturing defects. Cf. Racer v. Utterman,
629 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub
noma. Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982).
62. See generally Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 376
(Mo. 1986) (en banc).
63. See, e.g., Heaton v. Ford Motor Co., 248 Or. 467, 472, 435 P.2d 806,
809 (1967).
64. The paradigm case is Vincer v. Esther Williams All-Aluminum Swimming
Pool Co., 69 Wis. 2d 326, 230 N.W.2d 794 (1975) (two year old child was injured
when he fell into a swimming pool at his grandparents' home). RESTATEmENT, supra
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adoption of this apparently "user friendly" approach to the issue of legal
defectiveness, the courts feel that such issues generally cannot be left to the
jury without the benefit of expert testimony. The expert testimony required
does not appear to be testimony as to what a consumer's expectations are
but rather proceeds along the line of what a consumer's expectations should
be.65
Therefore, the conclusion is soon reached that the courts are in fact
applying a totally foreign test under the guise of this so-called "consumer
expectations" test. In the words of the Supreme Court of Washington:
In determining the reasonable expectations of the ordinary consumer, a
number of factors must be considered. The relative cost of the product,
the gravity of the potential harm from the claimed defect and the cost
and feasibility of eliminating or minimizing the risk may be relevant in a
particular case. In other instances the nature of the product or the nature
of the claimed defect may make other factors relevant to the issue.
Thus, to state that "[t]he consumer expectations test is natural since
strict liability developed from the law of warranty," 67 may assist in attaining
note 19, § 402A comment i provides that "[t]he article sold must be dangerous to
an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who
purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its char-
acteristics." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, the questidn is begged, who is the consumer
in this case? This two-year-old? The reasonable (sic) two-year-old? The grandparents?
Clearly, the consumer expectations test is an example of an attempt to modify
a commercial law standard (merchant's expectations) for a consumer-type transaction.
Its literal emphasis on consumer satisfaction (quality of goods) is ill-suited to any
inquiry into the redistribution of consumer injuries (safety of goods). Not only is the
consumer expectation arguably that the product should be safe, but the test is de-
monstrably artificial when applied to, for example, a case in which a nonpurchaser/
consumer has been injured. For the imposition of liability in Missouri in favor of
such a bystander despite the "consumer expectations" test, see Giberson v. Ford
Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8 (Mo. 1974).
65. See, e.g., Rosburg v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co., 181 Cal. App. 3d
726, 732-33, 226 Cal. Rptr. 299, 303-04 (1986) (involving a breast prosthesis) which
states:
When the product at issue is within the scope of common experience, the
consumer expectation test may be applied without benefit of expert testimony
.... As the subject of mammary implants is outside the realm of common
experience, the expert testimony was relevant and admissible. Thus, evidence
supports the trial court's finding that the implants were not expected to last
a lifetime and, that an ordinary consumer should expect a possibility of
eventual deflation.
Id. (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Hurt v. General Motors Co., 553
F.2d 1181, 1184 (8th Cir. 1977); Kayser v. Rockwell Graphic Sys., 666 F.2d 1233,
1236 (8th Cir. 1982); Birchfield v. International Harvester Co., 726 F.2d 1131, 1136
(6th Cir. 1984); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 851 (Tex. 1979).
66. Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 154, 542 P.2d 774,
779 (Wash. 1975).
67. Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. Rv. 339,
348 (1974).
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a better understanding of the historical basis of products liability; it does
not, however, assist in determining which product related injuries will, let
alone should, be redistributed.
The pretender to the theoretical throne has been the risk-utility test.68
The Western District Court of Appeals of Missouri has been notable in its
endorsement and application of this approach. In Lewis v. Bucyrus-Erie,
Inc.,69the supreme court declined to determine the theory of products liability
in Missouri. Prior to transferring that case, however, the Western District
Court of Appeals had adopted the risk-utility theory as one factor to employ
in deciding whether a product design defect was actionable. In the subsequent
case of Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co.,70 the same court again endorsed
the risk-utility approach, somewhat ironically by adopting a well-recognized
exception to that test:
Accordingly, although the question whether a risk-benefit analysis is es-
sential to a prima facie case in technologically complex design defect cases
has not yet been decided in Missouri, our courts have consistently found
68. The most famous example of the application of risk-utility analysis comes
to us from the leading California opinion, Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co. 20. Cal. 3d 413,
435, 573 P.2d 443, 457-458, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 239-40, (1978).
[A] trial judge may properly instruct the jury that a product is defective
in design (1) if the plaintiff demonstrates that the product failed to perform
as safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an intended
or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) if the plaintiff proves that the
product's design proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to
prove... that on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh
the risk of danger inherent in such design.
Id. (emphasis added).
For an illustration of the use of this risk-utility analysis in California, see
Campbell v. General Motors Corp., 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr.
891 (1982) (en banc), (bus manufacturer held liable to injured passenger for failure to
place a guardrail within reach of passenger).
For a recent adoption of the risk-utility analysis, see Rix v. General Motors
Corp., - Mont. -, 723 P.2d 195 (1986) (single brake system defective and
unreasonably dangerous in light of technological feasibility of dual brake system at
time vehicle manufactured). See also Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871,
880 (Alaska 1979); Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 147 Ariz. 242, -, 709 P.2d 876, 879-80
(1985); Ontai v. Straub Clinic & Hosp., 66 Haw. 237, 659 P.2d 734 (1983); Voss v.
Black & Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983).
For a discussion of some of the negligence issues that may infiltrate the risk-
utility analysis, see Birnbaum & Wrubel, "State of the Art" and Strict Products
Liability, 21 ToRT & INs. L.J. 30, 37-38 (1985).
69. 622 S.W. 2d 920 (Mo. 1981) (en banc).
70. 660 S.W.2d 404, 413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Cf. Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel
& Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828, 836-37 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) (because the issue was
not preserved for review, the Eastern District Court of Appeals rejected defendant's
attempts to gain consideration of risk-utility analysis).
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that in technologically simple cases, a submissible case can be made absent
such an analysis.'
Finally, the gauntlet was picked up by the Missouri Supreme Court in
Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc.72 The majority opinion in Nesselrode
provides the first extensive review by the supreme court of the theoretical
basis for strict products liability. Despite this encouraging development, no
final conclusion as to this issue was reached. The court stated:
Though Missouri has adopted the rule of strict tort liability as set forth
in the Restatement, we have not yet formally incorporated, in any mean-
ingful way, the Restatement's consumer expectation test into the lexicon
of our products liability law. Nor have we yet decided to travel or required
plaintiffs to travel the path of risks and utilities. And in this connection,
we note that none of the parties in the present case, at either the trial
level or on appeal, has raised as an issue the applicable standard by which
to determine when a product as designed, is defective and therefore ac-
tionable.
73
71. 660 S.W.2d at 413. This approach is in accord with the leading case of
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 68, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978):
[T]he court is to determine, and to weigh in the balance, whether the pro-
posed alternative design has been shown to be practicable. The trial court
should not permit an allegation of design defect to go to the jury unless
there is sufficient evidence upon which to make this determination ....
In some cases, because of the relatively uncomplicated nature of the product
or the design feature in question, evidence of the dangerous nature of the
design in question or of a safer alternative design may be sufficient to permit
the court to consider this factor adequately.
Id.
This accurate analysis of the plaintiff's burden in establishing that the product
in question was legally defective should be distinguished from those cases where
plaintiff is forced to establish, through the use of circumstantial evidence, the nature
of the factual defect that allegedly caused plaintiff s injury. See generally infra text
accompanying notes 97-108.
See generally Kayser v. Rockwell Graphic Sys., 666 F.2d 1233 (8th Cir. 1982).
For a Missouri case dealing with the relative weight to be allocated to types of expert
testimony, see Sparks v. Consolidated Aluminum Co., 679 S.W.2d 348 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984). See also Limbocker v. Ford Motor Co., 619 S.W.2d 757, 760-61 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981).
72. 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
73. Id. at 377-78 (footnote and citation omitted); cf. Hoppe v. Midwest Con-
veyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1202 (8th Cir. 1973):
Liability alleged from defective design encompasses many factors not gen-
erally relevant to ordinary negligence in tort cases. The comparative design
with similar and competitive machinery in the field, alternate designs and
post accident modification of the machine, the frequency or infrequency of
use of the same product with or without mishap, and the relative cost and
feasibility in adopting other design (sic) are all relevant to proof of defective
design.
Id. (citation and footnotes omitted).
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Notwithstanding this conclusion, in determining the specific issues on
appeal in Nesselrode, the majority opinion clearly utilized aspects of the risk-
utility test.74 Whether or not an appellate court chooses to utilize this test,
however, is distinct from a more important threshold question. Should Mis-
souri adopt any definition of "unreasonably dangerous""7 or, instead, should
it permit that phrase to be dealt with by its juries as an "ultimate issue?"' 76
From the court's deliberations on this question in Nesselrode, 7 it seems
arguable that its existing treatment as an ultimate issue will be preserved. 7
74. 707 S.W.2d at 382; cf. Hylton v. John Deere Co., 802 F.2d 1011, 1014-
15 (8th Cir. 1986) (apparently reviewing trial court evidence going to risk-utility with
the consumer expectations test).
75. A determination to provide a definition for the jury does not answer the
separate question as to the appropriate test (or definition) to be utilized. See Turner
v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 846-51 (Tex. 1979) (shifting definition of
defectiveness from consumer expectations to risk-utility formulation).
Even if Missouri was to adopt a definition of "unreasonably dangerous,"
such as the risk-utility test, that would beg an additional question. Should the risk-
utility test be considered as an ultimate issue or should it be defined by reference to,
for example, Dean Wade's criteria approved by the court in Byrns v. Riddell Inc.,
113 Ariz. 264, 550 P.2d 1065 (1976)? The reference to Dean Wade concerns the classic
exposition of the factors to be considered in applying the risk-utility test to be found in
Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 837-
38 (1973), apparently cited with approval by the court in Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg.
Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 411-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
76. See Vetri, Products Liability: The Developing Framework for Analysis,
54 OR. L. REv. 293 (1975); cf. Wade, supra note 75.
77. 707 S.W.2d 371, at 378. But cf. id. at 389 (Judge Blackmar's statement
to the effect that, "I am not certain that the unadorned submission of unreasonable
danger as an ultimate issue is appropriate for all products liability cases. I have
particular reservations in cases in which a product has apparent social utility and
cannot be made wholly safe."). Unfortunately, Judge Blackmar's statement may be
applied to all products, all of which have some social utility and some dangerous
propensity. The questions posed by so-called "unavoidably unsafe products" are
discussed infra, text accompanying note 136. See also Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel &
Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828, 837 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) ("We have been cited no
Missouri authority requiring a trial court to define the terms 'defective' and 'unrea-
sonably dangerous."').
78. The court made extensive reference to the arguments of Professor Leon
Green. See Green, supra note 32, at 1203-06. Professor Green makes much of the
absence of any such definition from other torts. However, the examples he picks are
all fairly simple utilizations of the natural meaning of the ultimate issue. That cannot
be said of unreasonably dangerous which has no natural "jury" meaning outside of
hazardous or perilous. The closest doctrinal analogy to section 402A is section 519
(ultrahazardous activities). Yet in that type of case, tight judicial control is kept over
what may be characterized as ultrahazardous. See supra note 44.
For the Missouri Supreme Court, however, preservation of the existing ulti-
mate issue will lead to the jury "giv[ing] this concept content by applying their broad
collective intelligence and experience to the broad evidentiary spectrum of facts and
circumstances presented by the parties." Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 378; cf. Hen-
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Ironically, this result, arguably designed to further the decision-making
role of the jury, instead will lead to that institution's ultimate disempower-
ment. The products liability jury's role, like the malpractice jury before it,
will be reduced to choosing between competing experts' views as to which
products are defective unreasonably dangerous, and hence which product
risks should be redistributed.7 9 The jury's meaningful role may only be per-
petuated by supplying it with the true criteria for such redistribution.
Practical considerations also arise. The appellate courts will be forced
into some definition of "unreasonably dangerous" for their own purposes.
At trial, counsel, while not addressing the jury on the issue of, for example,
risk-utility analysis, nevertheless might find it prudent to introduce such
evidence in order to satisfy a potential appellate reviewerA0
Certainly, supreme court determination that a risk-utility analysis will
not be adopted either as a definition of "unreasonably dangerous" or as a
new ultimate issue would explain its failure to address an issue extensively
discussed in Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co.;8 specifically, the appropriate
allocation of the burden of proof with regard to such a risk-utility analysis.
derson, Judicial Review of Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication,
73 CoLum. L. Rnv. 1531 (1973).
In Nesselrode, the court concluded that "[t]he jury was provided a number
of feasible alternative 'murphy proof' designs. They were free to infer that an alter-
native design would have been safer and would have prevented this accident." 707
S.W.2d at 382. Such a statement surely begs the question, if the court wishes thejury to undertake such a process, why not instruct it to do so? At least three possible
answers suggest themselves. First, the court may be unconvinced that jury application
of the risk-benefit analysis criteria would induce any tangible benefits, such as lower
administrative costs for trial courts or cheaper information costs for insurers. Second,
the court might feel that the introduction of structured criteria for the jury might
upset the redistribution rationale that the court has instituted. If this is the case, the
court should be explicit about it. Third, the court might feel that it would be faced
with far more difficult appellate questions if the ultimate issue was to be defined or
rephrased. The court would face unending invitations to second guess the jury de-
termination. As the system presently operates, the court can maintain a general and
more distanced supervisory stance without becoming so embroiled. See generally the
somewhat cursory appellate review that the legal defectiveness issue received in Racer
v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied and appeal
dismissed sub nom. Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982). See also
Aronson's Men's Stores v. Potter Elec. Signal, 632 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Mo. 1982) (en
banc), containing the somewhat facile statement that the whole point of pattern
instructions is that they should not require further clarification, thus begging the
question as to whether the existing instructions correctly approximate the doctrine
that is being applied by the appellate courts on whose opinions the pattern instructions
are based.
79. See, e.g., Hylton v. John Deere Co., 802 F.2d 1011, 1014 (8th Cir. 1986).
80. See, e.g., Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 393 (Mo.
1986) (en banc) (Welliver, J., dissenting).
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The California Supreme Court, in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., Inc., was
most specific as to this issue. The court stated:
Because most of the evidentiary matters which may be relevant to the
determination of the adequacy of a product's design under the "risk-
benefit" standard-e.g., the feasibility and cost of alternative designs-
are similar to issues typically presented in a negligent design case and
involve technical matters peculiarly within the knowledge of the manu-
facturer, we conclude that once a plaintiff makes a prima facie showing
that the injury was proximately caused by the product's design, the burden
should appropriately shift to the defendant to prove, in light of the rel-
evant factors, that the product is not defective.Y
To whatever extent the Missouri Supreme Court confronts the risk-utility
analysis question, it will be forced to address some other difficult questions.
One of these will entail examining the vitality of the heretofore wen-respected
"9consumer expectations" test.
The Barker test places both the consumer expectations test, with the
burden of proof remaining on the plaintiff, and the risk-utility test, with the
burden of proof placed on the defendant, to the jury."3 Given the pronounced
pro-plaintiff stance of the then-constituted California Supreme Court, 4 it
may be suggested that the court felt that the plaintiff's ends, although well
served in most cases by the risk-utility test, needed still further protection
in, for example, manufacturing defect cases. Thus, in a quality control case,
it would be far easier for a plaintiff to make her case utilizing the consumer
expectations test rather than risking the introduction by a defendant man-
ufacturer of a risk-utility analysis bearing upon its quality control system.
As one appellate court recently has framed the issue:
Under current Arizona law the consumer expectation test is the appropriate
one for a manufacturing defect, as opposed to a design defect. If some-
thing goes wrong in the manufacturing process, the result is a product
which the manufacturer did not intend and which could hardly be con-
templated by the consumer.' 5
With Nesselrode the supreme court has demonstrated an apparent neglect
for the important, albeit limited, role of the consumer expectations test.
82. 20 Cal. 2d 413, 431, 573 P.2d 443, 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225, 237 (1978).
83. Id. at 429-36, 573 P.2d at 454-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 236-40.
84. See, e.g., id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
85. Boy v. I.T.T. Grinnell Corp., 150 Ariz. 526, -, 724 P.2d 612, 620
(1986); see also Caprara v. Chrysler Corp., 52 N.Y.2d 114, 128-29, 417 N.E.2d 545,
552, 436 N.Y.S.2d 251, 258, (1981) (Jansen, Jones, & Meyer, J.J., dissenting) ("[A]
defectively manufactured product is flawed because it is misconstructed without regard
to whether the intended design of the manufacture was safe or not. Such defects
result from some mishap in the manufacturing process itself, improper workmanship,
or because defective materials were used in construction.").
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It is virtually impossible to determine the nature of the substantive ap-
proach to the issue of "unreasonably dangerous" without considering the
type of evidence that the jury will be permitted to consider. Therefore, any
endorsement by the court of, for example, a more explicit utilization of the
risk-utility analysis or a definition based upon consumer expectations would
have to be accompanied by a determination as to the factors that would be
considered i-n that context. 86
III. FACTUAL DEFECT AND LEGAL DEFECTIVENESS
In adopting the Restatement's test of defectiveness-'"a defective con-
dition unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated use' '1-
Missouri has opened itself up to a debate that has raged in many jurisdic-
tions.8 Specifically, the question is whether such a formulation creates a
bifurcated test placing too great a burden upon the plaintiff.8 9 Although
some courts reacted unfavorably to such a expression of the test for liability, 0
the Missouri experience has been less dramatic. 9' The Missouri Supreme Court
has stated that "a product may be found to be in a 'defective condition
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property,' and,
therefore, actionable under section 402A, when the product is found to be
'defective and dangerous when put to a use reasonably anticipated' by the
manufacturer." 92
86. For example, if the Missouri Supreme Court refuses to admit state of the
art evidence in the sense of industry capability at the time of manufacture, see infra
text accompanying notes 171-73, then there would appear to be little necessity in
shifting the burden of proof with regard to feasible alternatives to the manufacturer.
See generally infra text accompanying notes 141-206 for discussion of state of the art
evidence.
87. MAI 25.04, Strict Liability - Product Defect.
88. The quality of debate has not been assisted by the duplicative and circular
definitions of "defective condition" and "unreasonably dangerous" to be found in
RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 402A comments g and i, respectively.
89. Intermingled with that objection has been the feeling that the bifurcated
test is more susceptible to the importation of negligence concepts. See, e.g., Cronin
v. Olson, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133-34, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972).
But see Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 377 n.8 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc).
90. See, e.g., Cronin, 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433
(excising "unreasonably dangerous" from the formulation). The Cronin formulation
was itself abrogated by the Supreme Court of California's decision in Barker v. Lull
Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978) (discussed further
infra note 99). See also Azzarello v. Black Bros. Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020
(1978).
91. See, e.g., McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 672 F.2d 652, 661 (8th Cir.
1982).
92. Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 607 (Mo. 1977) (en banc)
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While a discourse featuring such circular reasoning may not be very
helpful in furthering comprehension of the concept of legal defectiveness, it
does not lead to a conclusion that the court is particularly disturbed by the
basic language of the Restatement. More recent opinions suggest, however,
that a degree of intermingling of these concepts may be endearing itself to
the majority of the supreme court. 9 However, at the same time the supreme
court seems to have few problems with the current wording of Missouri's
approved instructions despite their apparent endorsement of the bifurcated
test.9 4 Nevertheless, the promise of doctrinal over-simplicity inherent in any
such conflation undoubtedly will lead to problems for the lower courts. 9
In fact despite extensive debate by the courts and academics, it is ar-
guable that the bifurcated "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" test
masks no mysterious, let alone menacing, defense-biased meaning. Rather,
it involves a most simple statement of the content of plaintiff's cardinal
burden of proof.96
Prior to addressing any normative issue of "legal defectiveness, '" 97 the
plaintiff first must establish that the product involved in the litigation is
93. See, e.g., Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, 673 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Mo. 1984) (en
banc) ("Thus, plaintiffs established that [the product] was 'defective' when they
proved that it was unreasonably dangerous as designed."); Nesselrode v. Executive
Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 375 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) ("the plaintiff bears the burden
of demonstrating that the product, as designed, is unreasonably dangerous and there-
fore 'defective."').
94. See, e.g., Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 377 n.9. The only recent problem
that the Missouri Supreme Court had with the "defective condition unreasonably
dangerous" formulation occurred in Aronson's Men's Stores v. Potter Elec. Signal,
632 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. 1982). Aronson's involved a burglary at a store during which
the burglar alarm installed by the defendants failed to operate properly. The supreme
court became embroiled in an argument as to whether the product was "defective"
and "unreasonably dangerous." While the court seems correct in holding that the
product was not (factually) defective-after all, the product's failing was identified
by the plaintiff-it seems difficult to justify the court's opinion that the product was
not "unreasonably dangerous." Under either the consumer expectations or the risk-
utility test the product was (legally) defective. What was before the court was a
completely different issue. Should strict tort liability apply at all to such a circum-
stance? See, e.g., Sharp Brothers Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co.,
703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986) (en banc). The Aronson's court's problems began when
it attempted to answer that issue in terms of the basic test for legal defectiveness.
95. See, e.g., Fahy v. Dresser Indus., No. 50783, slip op. at 14-15 (Mo. Ct.
App, Jan. 27, 1987), in which plaintiff's expansive reading of Elmore's fusion of
these issues was rejected by the court of appeals. Basically, plaintiff was suggesting
that after Elmore his burden was reduced to establishing the existence of a defect,
and that it did not extend to having to show that the product could have been rendered
safer.
96. See, e.g., Southern Co. v. Graham, 271 Ark. 223, 225, 607 S.W.2d 677,
679 (1980) (providing that "[t]he doctrine of strict liability does not change the burden
of proof as to the existence of a flaw or defect in a product.").
97. The Restatement test for this being "unreasonably dangerous." As dis-
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"factually defective. ' '9 8 Simply put, plaintiff must identify with some spec-
ificity what she alleges went wrong with the product.9
The classic example of how the failure to identify a factual defect in
the product may pose an insurmountable obstacle to recovery is the Oregon
case of Heaton v. Ford Motor Co.1°° The plaintiff was injured when his
truck left the road. Evidence at trial established that the truck had hit a
small rock some thirty-five miles earlier and, following the accident, the rim
of one wheel was found to be separated from its center (or "spider"). Ac-
cording to the court, "plaintiff failed to introduce evidence of flawed man-
ufacture or dangerous design."''° Plaintiff's argument apparently was that
a jury issue was disclosed on the basis that an ordinary consumer's expec-
tations would be that trucks do not crash following collisions with small
rocks. The court, however, was adamant that the plaintiff had the burden
of proving the existence of a more specific defect. 0 2 As the Heaton court
acknowledged,"'' plaintiff frequently will be able to rely upon circumstantial
evidence to establish what went wrong with the product. 1°4 It must be re-
cussed supra note 78, this may be achieved by making use of that Restatement term
as the ultimate issue or, for example, by reference to the consumer expectations or
risk-utility "tests."
98. In the language of the Restatement: "defective condition." See also Hig-
gins v. Paul Hardeman, 457 S.W.2d 943, 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970) ("dangerous
condition").
99. Compare jurisdictions that apply a burden shift on the issue of legal
defectiveness. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 436, 573 P.2d
443, 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,239-40 (1978) (once plaintiff establishes factual defect
and causation, burden shifts to defendant to rebut legal defectiveness).
100. 248 Or. 467, 435 P.2d 806 (1967) (en banc).
101. Id. at 471-72, 435 P.2d at 808.
102. Id at 473-74, 435 P.2d at 809. Unfortunately the plaintiff's argument so
concerned the court that it lost sight of the real issue in the case; whether plaintiff
had established the existence of a factual defect. Instead, the court addressed dir6ctly
the plaintiff's contention that the consumer expectations test should apply. Clearly,
that issue arises only in the context of "legal defectiveness" and presupposes the
identification by plaintiff of a factual defect.
103. Id. at 471-72, 435 P.2d at 808. Consider, for example, Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, 32 N.J. 358, 371-73, 161 A.2d 69, 77 (1969); Elmore v. American
Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 2d 578, 583, 451 P.2d 84, 87, 75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 655 (1969)
(en banc).
104. See, e.g., Tucker v. Central Hardware Co., 463 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1971); Lifritz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 472 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo. Ct. App.
1971); Brissette v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 479 S.W.2d 176, 181-82 (Mo. Ct. App.
1972); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 494 S.W.2d 678, 681 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973);
Winters v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 S.W.2d 565, 569-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977);
Williams v. Deere & Co., 598 S.W.2d 609 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980); Coulter v. Michelin
Tire Corp., 622 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981); Webster v. Empiregas Inc., 648
S.W.2d 198, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Fain v. GTE Sylvania, 652 S.W.2d 163 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983); Fisher v. Scott & Fetzer Co., 664 S.W.2d 662, 664 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984); Uder v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 668 S.W.2d 82, 92-93 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
1987]
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membered, however, that "[t]he doctrine of strict product liability . . . does
not relieve the proponent of a defective product claim from the burden of
proof as to the existence of a defect. 05
Of course, in practice, the issues of factual defect and legal defectiveness
have a tendency to become intermingled.°0 Particularly in design and warning
cases, plaintiff's expert testimony as to what went wrong with the product
and what alternative approaches were available often will emerge as a seam-
less whole.107
In fact, it is really only in manufacturing defect cases that plaintiff
habitually will face problems with regard to this factual defect issue. 0 8 It is
primarily in those cases that the product defect alleged might have occurred
only in the particular product involved in that particular case.
IV. WARNINGS AND UNAVOIDABLY UNSAFE PRODUCTS
A. The Duty to Warn
As the supreme court recognized in Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft,
Inc.,
The determinative issue in a products liability failure to warn case is
whether the information accompanying the product effectively commu-
nicates to the consumer or user the dangers that inhere in the product
Patterson v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 674 S.W.2d 599, 604 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984);
Wadlow v. Lindner Homes, 722 S.W.2d 621, 625 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). Cf. Lawson
v. Schumaker & Blum Chevrolet, 687 S.W.2d 947 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
In Klein v. General Elec. Co., 714 S.W.2d 896, 900-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986),
the homeowners brought a products liability action against the manufacturer of a
coffeemaker that allegedly caused a fire. The court noted that under Missouri law
proof of the existence and consequences of a defect did not require expert testimony.
Nevertheless, it was clear that the court was impressed with the type of expert tes-
timony that had been elicited.
105. Mixon v. Chrysler Corp., 281 Ark. 202, , 663 S.W.2d 713, 714 (1984)
(citation omitted); see also Miller v. Dvornik, 149 Ill. App. 3d, 883, 501 N.E.2d 160,
165 (1986).
106. See, e.g., Lifritz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 472 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1971).
107. See, e.g., Baker v. International Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983).
108. One court arguably has overstated the issue when it stated, "Where the
product is made precisely as it was intended to be made, the true test is whether the
product is unreasonably dangerous when put to a use reasonably anticipated." Ca-
placo One, Inc. v. Amerex Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1116, 1119 (E.D. Mo. 1977) (citations
and reference omitted). More accurately, plaintiff will still have the burden of estab-
lishing the existence of a factual defect. However, that burden will be comparatively
light, given the existence of identical products with the same alleged defect.
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during normal use and the dangerous consequences that can or will result
from misuse or abnormal use of the product. Warnings and directions
concerning the proper use of a product and the consequences of misuse
are intended primarily to lessen the level of risk.'1
According to the approved instruction, plaintiff's task, with regard to
demonstrating the existence of a marketing defect, is twofold. First, the
product must be shown to have been "unreasonably dangerous when put to
a reasonably anticipated use without knowledge of its characteristics."" 0
Second, the defendant must not have provided an adequate warning."'
From the jury's perspective, there is an obvious disparity in the infor-
mation costs incurred by consumers as opposed to those in the manufacturing
and distribution chain. This realization, coupled with the presence of an
injured plaintiff, renders as slight the ability of the manufacturer to escape
liability on the ground of adequacy of warning."2 As a result, in warning
cases, primary attention is focused on the issue of the product's defectiveness
absent the contended for warning."'
In Missouri, the issue of defectiveness in warning cases piggybacks the
defectiveness inquiry in design cases. The plaintiff must establish that the
109. 707 S.W.2d 371, 382 (Mo. 1986) (reference and citation omitted).
110. MAI 25.05.
111. See also Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 384. It would seem that a warning
cannot be considered adequate unless, in addition to warning the consumer, the user
is thereby warned of the dangers that can be expected in the event of failure to follow
the warning. Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
112. See, e.g., Michael v. Warner/Chilcott, 91 N.M. 651, 579 P.2d 183 (Ct.
App. 1978); Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, 723 S.W.2d 392, 396 (Mo. 1987) (en banc)
("We conclude that the jury could find that the letter is not clear enough to warn
hospital personnel that one method of use which had been common in the past should
no longer be made."); cf. Haines v. Powermatic Houdaille, 661 F.2d 94, 96 (8th Cir.
1981); Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
For recent cases holding that a manufacturer's written warnings were adequate as a
matter of law, see Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931, 935-36 (M.D. Ga.
1986); Wilson v. Lockwood, 711 S.W.2d 545, 548-49 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). Note that
both cases involved the presence (factually if not legally) of "learned intermediaries."
For the issues involved in the determination of the causal effect that a warning
would have had, see infra text accompanying notes 253-60.
113. The exception is where manufacturers concentrate their energies on trying
to establish that the particular distribution system utilized in their industry militates
against any direct warning to the consumer, and, thus, that the warning as given was
adequate. See, e.g., Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 857-60
(8th Cir. 1975); see also Walker v. Merck & Co., 648 F. Supp. 931 (M.D. Ga. 1986).
This so-called "learned intermediary" defense seldom operates outside of the pre-
scription drug arena. For an interesting variation, see Hill v. Air Shields, 721 S.W.2d
112, 117-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), in which defendant argued that it had no duty to
warn a learned intermediary of risks within the realm of the intermediary's expertise.
See generally McCubbin & Schmidt, Missouri Pharmacists: Do They Have A Duty
To Warn?, 43 J. Mo. BAR 23 (January-February 1987).
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identified factual defect' 4 -in this context, the alleged dangerous character-
istic of the product in the absence of any warning-caused the product to
be "unreasonably dangerous." Even if this formulation is left to the jury
without definition as to the ultimate issue,' the trial or appellate court will
be forced to apply some more meaningful criteria.
Arguably, whether the court utilizes a consumer expectations or risk-
utility test for legal defectiveness, it will be forced to examine evidence as
to the available technology at the time of the product's manufacture, thus
making a nonsense of the supreme court's current blanket refusal to consider
"state of the art" evidence." 6 If the former test is utilized, it is difficult to
question the proposition that consumers do not expect manufacturers to warn
of dangers that are scientifically unknowable at the time of marketing. In
the case of the latter test, it is clear that the costs associated with the warning
of unknowable dangers would make it very difficult for the plaintiff to
succeed on a risk-utility theory.
In large part this is due to the modified role that the traditional tests
for legal defectiveness can have in this context. In marketing defect cases,
risk-utility analysis cannot be employed in the same way as in design cases.
Clearly it would be ridiculous to perform a balancing test in which the cost
of precautions was the cost of the warning itself. Such would make it almost
impossible for any product to escape the liability net. Instead, a far more
subjective test should be instituted, owing as much to consumer expectations
as to risk-utility analysis. In essence, the jury must be asked to judge the
requirement of a warning in the context of the relative costs of information
to the consumer and the manufacturer." 7 The availability of such information
is, therefore, one of the costs that must be considered by the jury.
Thus, there is considerable potential for overlap at this point with what
are considered obvious danger issues. In fact, in this context as in others,"'
defendant's allegation of "obvious danger" is no more than shorthand for
the argument that, with regard to this product, consumer-incurred infor-
114. Factual defect is considered supra text accompanying note 98.
115. See discussion supra text accompanying note 78.
116. See infra text accompanying note 160.
117. See, for example, the California jury instruction in warning cases, plainly
eschewing the combined risk-utility and consumer expectations approadh California
utilizes in manufacturing and design defect cases. Bar App'd J. Instr. 9.00.7 (Cal.
1984).
A product is defective if the use of the product in a manner that is reasonably
foreseeable by the defendant involves a substantial danger that would not
be readily recognized by the ordinary user of the product and the manu-
facturer fails to give adequate warning of such danger.
118. See infra text accompanying note 234.
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mation costs were extremely low.1 9 Furthermore, at common law a defendant
who had evidence that a particular plaintiff's incurred information costs were
lower than the typical consumer's was able to make a contributory fault
argument.1 20 Under Missouri's statutory comparative fault system, this af-
firmative defense is extended to situations in which, for example, plaintiff's
information costs, objectively tested, are merely low. 21
The apparent confusion as to the current state of Missouri law stems
from the somewhat extravagant statements that have appeared in recent su-
preme court opinions. Elmore's blanket exclusion of state of the art evidence'2
was followed by Nesselrode's extreme position that, under a strict liability
theory, "liability may be imposed without regard to the defendant's knowl-
edge or conduct."' 3 Such confusion is understandable in a jurisdiction that
traditionally has distinguished between strict liability and negligence theories
on the basis of constructive foresight. 24
It may be argued that the Elmore opinion is to be restricted to design
cases or to custom evidence. 25 It may be suggested that the majority opinion
in Nesselrode, while correctly holding irrelevant a manufacturer's knowledge
of risks in determining dangerousness, contained an unfortunate misconcep-
tion that strict products liability extended that view to the issue of reason-
ableness of precautionary measure.'2 There may even be some satisfaction
that the legislature acted swiftly to clarify the state of the art issue. 27 Never-
theless, doubts persist as to the supreme court's intentions in the duty to
warn field.
128
119. See McIntyre v. Everest & Jennings, 575 F.2d 155 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 864 (1978); see also Peterson v. Auto Wash Mfg. & Supply Co., 676 F.2d
949 (8th Cir. 1982); Einhaus v. 0. Ames Co., 617 S.W.2d 519 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981);
Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 418-19 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Grady
v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911, 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Hill v. Air
Shields, 721 S.W.2d 112, 117-18 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986); accord Bean v. Ross Mfg.,
344 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1961) (en banc).
120. Cf. H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 36(3)[3] (1987).
121. H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 36(3)[4]-[5] (1987).
122. 673 S.W.2d 434, 437-38 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
123. 707 S.W.2d 371, 383 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
124. Supra text accompanying note 49.
125. See infra text accompanying note 163.
126. It seems clear under either view that the use must be foreseeable. See,
e.g., Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911, 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985);
see also infra text accompanying note 251.
127. H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 35 (1987); see infra text
accompanying note 196.
128. For recent discussion of many of the difficult issues raised in the marketing
allegation context, see Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147,
200 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1984); Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 402 N.E.2d
194 (1980); Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984).
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Of course, the court may have intended to introduce an additional species
of stricter liability to deal with products that are "unreasonably dangerous
per se." As the Supreme Court of Louisiana has stated:
For products in this category liability may be imposed solely on the basis
of the intrinsic characteristics of the product irrespective of the manufac-
turer's intent, knowledge or conduct. This category should be acknowl-
edged as giving rise to the purest form of strict liability and clearly
distinguished from other theories in which the manufacturer's knowledge
or conduct is an issue. 29
If this remains the intention of the Missouri Supreme Court, it must
announce such a purpose and produce a doctrinal construct for examination
and application.'10 Any such stricter liability appears to be destined for prod-
ucts which, at the time of their manufacture, were incapable of being pro-
duced in a safe condition. Ironically, the original Restatement position was
that such products should be accorded a less strict regime.'
B. Unavoidably Unsafe Products
According to the Restatement, "[t]here are some products which, in the
present state of human knowledge, are quite incapable of being made safe
for their intended and ordinary use.... Such a product, properly prepared,
and accompanied by proper directions and warning is not defective, nor is
it unreasonably dangerous."'' 2 At first sight, this recognition of a products
subset performs a useful function. There exist a certain number of products
that cannot be made safer without destroying their utility, and yet which
society wishes to be marketed, albeit with appropriate warnings.'33
Unfortunately, the sheer obviousness of this position guaranteed that
this principle would be assimilated into the core doctrine of modem products
129. Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110, 113-14 (La. 1986).
The adoption of such a form of "stricter liability" is a logically supportable position
for a court to adopt and, indeed, would provide a category in which some of our
modern mass-disaster/toxic torts type cases could be pigeonholed. As yet, however,
there is no suggestion of any criteria by which such a categorization would be trig-
gered. Halphen fails to provide any meaningful distinction between this "stricter"
form of liability and the existing species. In fact, the case stands for no more than
the proposition that some products fail the risk-utility test so badly that they should
not be marketed even with a warning. See Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264,
1273-74 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
130. The provision by the legislature of a formal state of the art defense will
make such a task difficult. See H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 35 (1987).
131. RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 402A comment k.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., Caplaco One, Inc. v. Amerex Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1116, 1120
(E.D. Mo. 1977) ("Comment k applies only where the danger is unavoidable, inev-
itable, as where there are dangerous-side effects to a drug."). See generally Woodill
v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, 36-37, 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (1980).
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liability, thus rendering any additional "unavoidably unsafe" characteriza-
tion redundant. 3 4 That product category was designed as a control device to
hinder overreaching by the consumer expectations test. The doctrine has no
role to play when a risk-utility analysis is being used as the determinant of
legal defectiveness in a design case. 3 5 A product that is unavoidably unsafe
is one for which there is no feasible alternate design'36 and therefore is not
"unreasonably dangerous." The court of appeals has indicated that this
approach approximates the law obtaining in Missouri, stating that:
Comment k to the Restatement recognizes that "unavoidably unsafe"
products achieve protection despite their danger "when accompanied by
proper directions and warning." Otherwise they do not. We believe that
the reasons for recognizing the doctrine of strict liability in tort are equally
applicable to products unavoidably unsafe which carry no warning or
inadequate warning of their danger." 7
Absent the natural and original meaning of comment k, defendants have
attempted to adapt it to another role. Thus, there has been an attempt to
134. For example, see Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1273 (8th Cir.)
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974), where the court stated:
Such [unavoidably dangerous] products are not necessarily "unreasonably
dangerous," for as this Court has long recognized in wrestling with products
liability questions, many goods possess both utility and danger. Rather, in
evaluating the possible liability of a manufacturer for injuries caused by his
inevitably hazardous products, a two-step analysis is required to determine
first, whether the product is so unsafe that marketing it at all is "unrea-
sonably dangerous per se", and, if not, whether the product has been in-
troduced into the stream of commerce without sufficient safeguards and is
thereby "unreasonably dangerous as marketed." In either case, the appli-
cable standard [is the consumer expectations test].
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
135. The unavoidably unsafe doctrine has no applicability with regard to either
manufacturing or marketing defect allegations. With regard to the former a product
cannot be unavoidably unsafe when other examples coming off the same production
line are safe. With regard to marketing defects, it is clear that an "unavoidably
unsafe" product may be marketed only if it is accompanied by an adequate warning.
136. See Caplaco One, Inc. v. Amerex Corp., 435 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (E.D.
Mo. 1977):
Assuming arguendo that Comment k does apply, liability does not attach
where proper warnings are present and where the utility of the product
outweighs the dangers accompanied by its use. As stated earlier, the Court
has found the warnings adequate to apprise the consumer of the condition
of the fire extinguisher, and also finds that the utility of the fire extinguisher
outweighs any danger which accompanies it.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 608
(Mo. 1977) (en banc) (golf cart capable of being designed safely).
137. Cf. Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 393 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (em-
phasis added) (holding unavoidably unsafe surgical drape unreasonably dangerous in
the absence of an adequate warning), cert. denied and appeal dismissed sub nom.
Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982).
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use the unavoidably unsafe doctrine as a conclusory label placed upon certain
products or types of products to reflect a judicial determination that the full
rigors of the strict liability system should not be placed upon the manufac-
turer. Originally utilized in the blood transfusion cases of the previous dec-
ade, "'38 there has been a recent reawakening of the potential for such
characterization in the area of prescription drugs. For example, in Feldman
v. Lederle Laboratories, the New Jersey Supreme Court rejected defendant
and amici arguments that all prescription drugs should be exempted from
the strict liability system. 39 However, the court was less dogmatic when
addressing claims that comment k was applicable:
[W]e see no reason to hold as a matter of law and policy that all pre-
scription drugs that are unsafe are unavoidably so. Drugs, like any other
products, may contain defects that could have been avoided by better
manufacturing or design. Whether a drug is unavoidably unsafe should
be decided on a case-by-case basis; we perceive no justification for giving
all prescription drug manufacturers a blanket immunity from strict liability
manufacturing and design defect claims under comment k.'4
V. STATE OF THE ART EVIDENCE
Dwarfing all issues as to the theoretical basis of modern products liability
is the current debate, now joined by the Missouri courts, with regard to the
admissibility of so called state of the art evidence.' 4' To the dismay of the
defense, recent opinions tend to suggest that Missouri has aligned itself with
the most pro plaintiff jurisdictions in this regard and have disallowed all
such evidence. As a result, the Missouri legislature has been forced to respond
with a partially curative measure. 42
From the defense perspective, the bete noire in this area is the opinion
of the New Jersey Supreme Court in Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products
Corp. ,43 In Beshada, the court overruled the trial judge's refusal of plaintiff's
138. See, e.g., Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 66 N.J. 448, 332 A.2d 596 (1975);
cf. Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial Hosp., 47 Ii. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
139. 97 N.J. 429, -, 479 A.2d 374, 380-83 (1984).
140. Id. at -, 479 A.2d at 383; see also Kearl v. Lederle Labs., 172 Cal.
App. 3d 812, 218 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1985); cf. Brown v. Superior Court, 227 Cal. Rptr.
768 (Ct. App. 1986) (prescription drugs are unavoidably unsafe); Collins v. Karoll,
231 Cal. Rptr. 396 (Ct. App. 1986) (prescription products are unavoidably unsafe as
a matter of law).
141. See generally Robb, A Practical Approach to the Use of State of the Art
Evidence in Strict Products Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U. L. REv. 1 (1982); Wade, On
the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv.
734 (1983).
142. See infra text accompanying note 196.
143. 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 5 9 (1982).
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motion to strike a state of the art defense. This was in the face of the
defendant's argument that,
the question of whether the product can be made safer must be limited
to consideration of the available technology at the time the product was
distributed. Liability would be absolute, defendants argue, if it could be
imposed on the basis of a subsequently discovered means to make the
product safer since technology will always be developing new ways to
make products safer. Such a rule, they assert, would make manufacturers
liable whenever their products cause harm, whether or not they are rea-
sonably fit for their foreseeable purposes.'"t
The wave of panic that greeted Beshada is reputed to have reached
Missouri 45 courtesy of the recent supreme court decisions Elmore v. Owens-
Illinois, Inc., 46 and Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc. 47 In Elmore,148
an asbestosis victim and his wife sued for damages allegedly resulting from
the victim's prolonged exposure to asbestos dust. The defendant had man-
ufactured an insulating material containing fifty percent asbestos that plain-
tiff had often been exposed to over a ten year period. Unlike most recent
examples of asbestos litigation,1 49 the plaintiff in Elmore submitted on the
basis of an alleged design defect'50 rather than on a marketing defect theory.'
When defendant raised this issue on appeal, the supreme court stated:
"It is a plaintiff's prerogative to choose the theory upon which he will submit
his case, so long as that theory is supported by the pleadings and the evi-
dence. 1 5 2 In general terms, an asbestosis plaintiff who wished to submit on
a design defect theory "would have to show that the product... could have
been manufactured with[, for example,] a substitute element which would
have made the product safer and at the same time maintained its effectiveness
for its intended use."' 53 It is unclear exactly how the Elmore plaintiff man-
aged to satisfy this burden in this particular case. Although apparently re-
solved, the issue of which theory to submit the case on was to continue to
144. Id. at 202-03, 447 A.2d at 545-46; cf. Bernier v. Raymark Indus., 516
A.2d 534 (Me. 1986)
145. Prior to those opinions the issue was alluded to by the court of appeals
in Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387, 394-95 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied
and appeal dismissed sub nom. Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982).
146. 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
147. 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
148. See Note, When the Best Defense is No Defense: The Future of State of
the Art Evidence in Product Liability Actions in Missouri, 50 Mo. L. Rlv 438 (1985).
149. For example, see the cases cited in Judge Welliver's dissent, 673 S.W.2d
at 411.
150. MAI 25.04, supra note 23.
151. MAI 25.05, supra note 23.
152. Elmore, 675 S.W.2d at 437 (citation omitted).
153. St. Leger, Goggin- & Brophy, Toxic Torts: Workable Defenses Available
to the Corporate Defendant, 28 ViL. L. REv. 1208, 1250 (1983).
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dominate the Elmore appeal, 5 4 particularly with regard to the state of the
art issue.'
Defendant asserted that its product was not defective, unreasonably dan-
gerous "if it [could] be shown that under the state of the art during the time
of manufacture defendant could not have known of the product's unreason-
able danger."'156 It would appear that the supreme court interpreted this
argument as being one of the following species: the defendant should not be
held liable because the risk involved with this product was not a foreseeable
one, or that the product was not defective because, at the time of manufac-
ture, it was the state of the art of the industry to design this product in this
particular way.
Clearly the supreme court was correct when it stated that "the sole
subject of inquiry [in a strict products liability claim] is the defective con-
dition of the product and not the manufacturer's knowledge, negligence or
fault."'3 7 It is equally clear that if the defendants were attempting to argue
state of the art in either of the two meanings ascribed to it by the supreme
court, then such evidence was not admissible. In the first place, whether or
not the manufacturer foresaw or reasonably should have foreseen the risks
attendant upon his product is irrelevant in a strict liability claim involving a
marketing or design allegation.'58 As to the second meaning, again, the court
was correct because "the plaintiff need not prove the violation of the stand-
ard of reasonable care for product design, but only that it was so defective
as to make the product unreasonably dangerous for the anticipated use."' 15 9
Despite the wholly supportable conclusion as to the inadmissibility of
the species of state of the art evidence proffered in Elmore, however, it is
by no means so clear that the supreme court should have made such a blanket
statement as "the law in Missouri holds that state of the art evidence has
no bearing on the outcome of a strict liability claim." 160 In short, Elmore
appears to be a case designed to be distinguished!
Firstly, it is an asbestosis case. Of course, it is almost heretical to assert
that modern products doctrine could be so subject matter sensitive.16' How-
ever, even in New Jersey, the rigorous approach that distinguished the Be-
154. See, e.g., 673 S.W.2d at 439-40 (Welliver, J., dissenting).
155. See generally Note, supra note 148.
156. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 437.
157. Id. at 438 (citing Crysts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978)).
158. Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 491-94, 525 P.2d 1033,
1036-37 (1974). For Missouri authority on this point, see supra note 49.
159. Johnson v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Mo. Ct. App.
1984).
160. Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 438.
161. See infra note 262.
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shada opinion has not been extended to other types of cases. 62 In the second
place, the unique submission on a design defect theory by plaintiff in Elmore
poses the question whether the ruling of the supreme court with regard to
the inadmissibility of the state of the art evidence has any bearing on such
an issue in the case of a marketing defect (failure to warn) allegation. 63 The
third difficulty with Elmore is that the majority of the supreme court failed
to define exactly what it meant by state of the art evidence. Only some of
these issues have been dealt with in the subsequent opinion of the Missouri
Supreme Court in Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., '6 a case in which
fears of a continued pro plaintiff shift by the Missouri courts hardly were
assuaged.
Nesselrode involved an airplane crash caused by the improper installation
of the elevator trim tab actuators on the tail section of an airplane in which
plaintiffs' deceased was a passenger. Plaintiffs submitted their case on both
design and marketing defect theories. The defendant's central challenge on
appeal was that the plaintiffs had failed to make a submissible case under
either theory. State of the art evidence was not an issue in the case. Never-
theless, frequent citation to Elmore 65 suggests not only continued supreme
court approval of that decision but, possibly, its extension to failure to warn
cases. Specifically, the court in Nesselrode stated:
Under the decisional law of Missouri, a plaintiff has two options. He can
bring his failure to warn case under a theory of negligence, or he can
bring his action under Section 402A. Under the former theory, knowledge
is a relevant consideration. But under the latter theory, liability may be
imposed without regard to the defendant's knowledge or conduct. This
view comports with the very raison d'etre of strict tort liability law. In
Elmore, we reaffirmed the principle that strict tort liability is not predi-
cated on the presence of fault or the existence of knowledge .... I
In the subsequent case of Lippard v. Houdaille Industries, Inc, the
supreme court recollected Elmore as holding "that a manufacturer could be
liable for a defective product, even though the state of the art at the time
162. See, e.g., Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, - , 479 A.2d 374,
385-86 (1984); O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983). Other
courts have recognized New Jersey's ambivalence. See Bernier v. Raymark Indus.,
516 A.2d 534 (Me. 1986).
163. Elmore has been followed in two subsequent Missouri appellate decisions.
In Johnson v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984) and in
Klein v. General Elec. Co., 714 S.W.2d 896, 905 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986), defendants
successfully utilized Elmore to resist the introduction of "state of the art" evidence.
Not only were both of these cases submitted on a design defect theory, but, fur-
thermore, in both cases the proffered evidence clearly went to the irrelevant issue of
defendant's fault.
164. 707 S.W.2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
165. 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
166. 707 S.W.2d at 383 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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of manufacture or sale was such that the defective character could not have
been known."' 167
The Missouri Supreme Court is not alone in experiencing difficulties
with the state of the art concept. The real problem is that different people,
particularly plaintiffs as opposed to defendants, 6 ascribe very different
meanings to that phrase in the products liability context.
State of the art may have as many as three different meanings in modem
products liability litigation. 169 First, it may refer to the generally accepted
practices of the particular industry in question at the time that the product
was manufactured (industry practice). 7 °Second, state of the art may refer
not merely to the customary practices of the industry in question, '7 but rather
to the available technology at that time (industry capability).72 Thus, state
of the art may connote a defense argument to the effect that plaintiff has
167. 715 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Mo. 1986) (en bane).
168. Also note that different results may well pertain depending upon whether
the "state of the art" evidence is being used for defensive (for example, compliance
with industry custom), offensive (for example, noncompliance with industry custom)
or even counter-offensive (infra, text at note 186) purposes. Compare the apparent
suggestion by Justice Welliver in Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 440, that the fact plaintiff
could introduce offensive state of the art evidence is suffficient rationale for per-
mitting defensive evidence of that type.
169. This fails to take account of the multitude of legislative meanings of this
concept. See, e.g., Aiuz. REv. STAT. Am. § 12-681(6) (1982); CoLO. REv. STAT. §
13-21-403(a) (1977); IDAHO CODE § 6-1406 (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-
20A-4(b)(4) (Burns 1986); NEB. REv STAT. § 25-21, 182 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. §
29-28-105(b) (1980); see also H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 35(1) (1987).
170. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-20A-4(b)(4) (Burns 1986). A similar
meaning to, or perhaps subsidiary meaning of, this custom type "state of the art"
is where a manufacturer wishes to make defensive reference to government or industry
codes prevailing at the time of manufacture. See, e.g., Annotation, Admissability of
Evidence on Issue of Negligence, of Codes or Standards of Safety Issued or Sponsored
by Governmental Body or by Voluntary Association, 58 A.L.R.3D 148 (1974). For
Missouri's position, see Murphy v. L & J Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407 (8th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); Poches v. J.J. Newberry Co., 549 F.2d 1166 (8th
Cir. 1977). See also Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, 697 F.2d 1192, 1198 (4th Cir.
1982).
171. A gray issue appears when defendant seeks to introduce evidence of the
custom of the industry in order to show that the industry lacked the capability to
produce the alternative safer design.
172. See generally, Annotation, Products Liability: Admissibility of Defend-
ant's Evidence of Industry Custom or Practice in Strict Liability Action, 47 A.L.R.4rA
621, 624 n.1 (1986). See also Robb, supra note 141, at 2, 5 (footnote omitted) (defining
state of the art as "then-existing technical capability" and "the point of scientific
and technological advance with respect to a given product at the time of the product's
manufacture and design") ("technological feasibility at the time of manufacture of
producing a safer product"); see, e.g., Foster v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 714 F.2d
654 (6th Cir. 1983) (at time of manufacture battery conformed to government stand-
ards and industry practice).
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failed to introduce sufficient evidence as to the existence of a feasible alter-
native design available at the time this particular product was manufac-
tured.' 73 The third possible meaning of state of the art refers to "the scientific
knowability at the time of manufacture of a risk associated with the prod-
uct,"
174 (industry knowability).175
It is arguable that the Missouri Supreme Court in both Elmore and
Nesselrode dealt only with the admissibility of state of the art evidence in
the first sense. 176 Consequently, the argument may be made that not only
should state of the art evidence in the second and third senses be admissible
in a strict products liability action, 77 but, furthermore, that the very issues
posed by the accepted definition of defective condition unreasonably dan-
gerous simply cannot be addressed absent such evidence. 178
Of course, this criticism is posited on the hypothesis that a court should
judge a product's defectiveness in the light of available technology at the
time of manufacture. Logically, a court that has dispensed with a fault based
system could judge that issue by reference to the technology existing at the
time of trial. 79 However, Missouri, from the time of its adoption of Section
173. Cf. Cryts v. Ford Motor Co., 571 S.W.2d 683, 689 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978)
(holding that plaintiff had introduced sufficient expert testimony as to availability of
alternative technologies at time of manufacture to overcome defendant's argument
that product had been built acccording to state of the art).
174. See, e.g., Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 68, at 31; see also Comment,
Requiring Omniscience: The Duty to Warn of Scientifically Undiscoverable Product
Defects, 71 GEo. L.J. 1635 (1983).
175. A workable definition of scientific knowability is to apply the "manu-
facturer as expert" test. See Halphen v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 484 So. 2d 110,
115 (La. 1986); see also H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 35(1) (1987).
176. For a discussion of the admissibility of feasibility evidence contrasted with
custom evidence, see Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208, 210-14, 683
P.2d 1097, 1099-1101 (1984).
177. In some jurisdictions "state of the art" evidence under the first meaning
is considered admissible on the basis that industry custom at the time of manufacture
is relevant to the prevailing "consumer expectations" at that time. See, e.g., Carter
v. Massey-Ferguson, 716 F.2d 344, 347 (5th Cir. 1983) (evidence of industry customs
relevant to ordinary consumer expectations); cf. Lenhardt, 102 Wash. 208, 683 P.2d
1097 (evidence of industry custom as a factor in evaluating consumer expectations is
not admissible unless plaintiff first puts industry custom into issue).
178. See, e.g., Birnbaum & Wrubel, supra note 68, at 33:
[To the extent that strict liability focuses on the product rather than on the
defendant's conduct, state of art evidence addresses the question of whether
the product was defective at the time of manufacture. In the context of a
failure to warn case, it is clear that a product cannot be made safer by the
addition of a warning if science and technology do not suggest to the man-
ufacturer that there is any hazard or risk to warn about.
Id.
179. For a summary of some of the competing arguments, see Wade, supra
note 141, at 751-56.
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402A, apparently opted for a less stringent approach; what may be termed
a manufacturer's hindsight rule. 80 Under this approach, any evidence as to
what the manufacturer knew, or should have known, with regard to the
hazards associated with its product are irrelevant. Yet, the jury, while ef-
fectively imputing this knowledge of risk of harm to the manufacturer,'
must then determine "whether a reasonable manufacturer, with knowledge
of such dangers, nevertheless would have put the product on the market."'8 2
It will be unable to carry out this mandate without the benefit of evidence
of industry capability at the time of manufacture."
It may be that the Missouri Supreme Court has resolved to abandon
this approach to determining legal defectiveness. If it has, it is not a step
that has been forced upon the court by the nature of strict liability as pre-
viously understood in Missouri. Neither is products liability doctrine alone
capable of providing answers to such questions. Rather, the supreme court
must determine, metalegally, the number of product related risks that it
wishes to redistribute. A commitment to a particular doctrinal construct must
be the conclusion to such a process.
It is equally clear that there is no logical reason why the product's safety
should be judged by reference to the technology or knowledge available at
the time of design, manufacture, injury or trial. On the other hand, an overly-
general, not to mention inflammatory,' 4 assertion that "[t]he purpose of
products liability law, essentially, is to socialize the losses caused by defective
products"' 85 does not furnish a doctrinal explanation of why a defendant
should be liable for a product related injury for which there was no known
alternative feasible design even at the time of trial.
180. See cases cited supra note 49; see also the discussion of this approach in
comparison with the consumer expectation test, supra note 61.
181. Hence the label of constructive foresight that often is applied to this
approach.
182. For an example of the approach in another jurisdiction, see, for example,
Dart v. Wiebe Mfg., 147 Ariz. 242, __, 709 P.2d 876, 883 (1985).
183. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 210,
195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767 (1983):
It seems apparent that evidence the design comported with the state of the
art is relevant to a proper determination of such cost and feasibility factors.
In reaching this conclusion, we recognize the rule. . . that evidence of in-
dustry custom and usage is irrelevant in a products liability case. The dis-
tinction between what are the capabilities of an industry and what practice
is customary in an industry must be kept in mind.
Id.; see also O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 164, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
184. Compare an earlier statement of Judge Donnelly: "Today, the Court
ignores settled Missouri law and implants, again without a rationale, a scheme for
redistribution of property." Johnson v. Pacific Intermountain Express Co., 662 S.W.2d
237, 247 (Mo. 1983) (en banc) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 973 (1984).
185. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
(Per Blackmar, J., in a somewhat different context).
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Even if the Missouri courts fail to move from their current, rather
Draconian stance, at the very least, a plaintiff who herself elects to introduce
evidence that alternative feasible alternatives were available at the time of
the trial should not be permitted to object to defendant's offer of evidence
in rebuttal that no such feasible alternatives were available at the time of
manufacture.
The facts of the recent Eighth Circuit opinion in Adams v. Fuqua In-
dustries, Inc.'86 are illustrative. Plaintiff had purchased a lawnmower in 1971
from defendant's predecessor. She suffered a partial amputation of her right
leg when she was thrown from the lawnmower in 1981. Defendant appealed
from the trial court's entry of judgment of a jury verdict holding the defend-
ant strictly liable for her injuries. At trial, plaintiff's experts testified that
the cause of the accident was, inter alia, the absence of a "smooth-start"
clutch and a "deadman" switch. 87 Crucially, neither of these safety devices
were commercially feasible at the time of the product's manufacture; a fact
that the plaintiff did not bring out. Absent such altruism, the Eighth Circuit
was faced with the question whether the defendant should be permitted to
introduce such evidence.1 88
The court made reference to leading Missouri cases stating that, "[Plain-
tiff] need not prove that the absent devices were or should have been known
to [defendant] in 1971 when the mower was manufactured. That the mower
was as safe as other mowers manufactured at the same time is irrelevant to
the question whether the mower was unreasonably dangerous." 18 9 The Eighth
Circuit, however, failed to make a distinction between this accurate statement
and the defendant's proposition that noncustom state of the art evidence
should be admissible. Instead, the court decided for the defendant on the
narrower ground that:
In this case, [plaintiff] did not rely solely on the opinion of her experts
that the danger could have been reduced by a deadman switch and a
smooth-start clutch. She also proved that [defendant] and others included
those devices in their mowers in 1981. Although this proof of what was
actually done in 1981 corroborated the experts' testimony that such devices
186. 806 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1986). (Fuqua has been withdrawn from the Federal
Reporter pending modification. 806 F.2d 770. Its factual basis continues to provide
an excellent example of the issue discussed. Reference will be made to the original
slip opinion.)
187. Nos. 85-2382, 85-2383, slip op. at 4 (8th Cir. Dec. 1, 1986).
188. See, e.g., Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash. 208, 213-14, 683 P.2d
1097, 1100 (1984) (en banc) (when plaintiff presents evidence that puts in issue the
industry custom or feasibility of alternate designs, defendant is entitled to counter
that evidence); Cantu v. John Deere Co., 24 Wash. App. 701, 706, 603 P.2d 839,
841 (1979) (when plaintiff makes state of the art and industry standards an issue, the
defendant is entitled to respond).
189. Fuqua, slip op. at 8 (citations omitted).
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could have been used to reduce the danger, it inevitably and pointedly
suggested to the jury that [defendant]'s conduct in omitting them from
the mower sold to [plaintiff] in 1971 was unreasonable. This proposition
is irrelevant to strict liability and was clearly prejudicial.'-
As if to make clear that the substantive law of Missouri was not jeop-
ardized by its decision, the court went on to comment that "Upon retrial,
[plaintiff] may elect to forego proof that these devices are now used on
mowers. If she tries the case without such proof, she would not be opening
the door to [defendant]'s proof."' 9
In conclusion, the Missouri Supreme Court has much work yet to do.
Neither Elmore, Nesselrode, nor Lippard presented the opportunity for the
court to hear full argument on the state of the art issue, a fortiori, in the
context of marketing defects. 92 The result of those cases has been an invi-
tation to the lower courts to merely incant the over-simplification that state
of the art is irrelevant under the law of of Missouri. 193
While a brightline rule excluding all evidence which goes to, say, industry
practice (mere custom) might be appropriate, 94 a more flexible approach
could be considered with regard to evidence pertaining to industry capability
or scientific knowability. This could be achieved by permitting the trial court
to exercise its discretion as to the admissibility of such species of evidence. 95
190. Id. at 9; see also Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129,
133 (8th Cir. 1985) (workplace regulations admissible to rebut, inter alia, plaintiff's
argument as to safety of alternative design).
191. Fuqua, slip op. at 10 (emphasis added).
192. Indeed, the only previous reference to this issue in a Missouri case had
been to the effect that
some products are, by their nature or the siate of the art, unavoidably
unsafe. So too do apparently useful and desirable products reach the market
encumbered with known but apparently reasonable risks. The sellers of such
products are not held to strict liability if the product is properly prepared
and marketed with appropriate warnings.
Keller v. International Harvester Corp., 648 S.W.2d 584, 588 n.1 (Mo. Ct. App.
1983) (interpreting REsTATEimENT, supra note 19, § 402A comment k).
193. See, e.g., Johnson v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884, 885 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1984).
194. Cf. Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208, 215-19, 683 P.2d
1097, 1101-03 (1984) (Dimmick, J., dissenting) (arguing that state of the art evidence,
even in its industry custom manifestation, is relevant to both consumer expectations
and risk-utility analysis approaches to determining legal defectiveness).
195. Some jurisdictions have instituted this more flexible approach with regard
to the analogous situation involving proffered evidence of previous safety history.
For example, see Jones v. Pak-Mor Mfg. Co., 145 Ariz. 121, -, 700 P.2d 819,
826-27 (1985), where the court stated that in design defect cases only (because such
evidence clearly would be irrelevant in a manufacturing defect case)
the trial court has discretion under Rule 403 to admit evidence of safety-
history concerning both the existence and the nonexistence of prior accidents,
[Vol. 52
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The route chosen by the Missouri legislature is somewhat different. "State
of the art" for the purposes of reform refers only to "industry knowabil-
ity. ' 196 Questions with regard to the admissibility of "industry capability"
evidence have been left for the courts.19 Furthermore, the admissibility of
"scientific knowability" evidence is restricted to marketing defect cases. 98
Thus, outside the marketing defect area, the traditional distinction between
negligence' 99 and strict liabilityw theories of products liability is preserved.
provided that the proponent establishes the necessary predicate for the evi-
dence. The evidence of safety-history is admissible on issues pertaining to
whether the design caused the product to be defective, whether the defect
was unreasonably dangerous, whether it was a cause of the accident, or-in
negligence cases-whether the defendant should have foreseen that the design
of the product was not reasonably safe for its contemplated uses.
Id. (footnote omitted).
196. " '[SItate of the art' means that the dangerous nature of the product was
not known and could not reasonably be discovered at the time the product was placed
into the stream of commerce." H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 35(1)
(1987).
197. "This section shall not be construed to permit or prohibit evidence of
feasibility in products liability claims." H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., §
35(4) (1987). See FINAL REPORT OF THE MISSOURI TASK FORCE ON LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE (Jan. 6, 1987), Mo. SEN. J., March 4, 1987, at 382 ("The
Task Force sees this as a separate issue, one upon which it is not making a specific
recommendation to the General Assembly") [hereinafter Final Report]. But cf. "This
recommendation does not apply to use of evidence in strict liability cases based on
alleged manufacturing or design defects because the defense of feasibility is avail-
able." Id at 381.
198. H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 35(2) (1987).
199. The statute makes a point of stating that, "Nothing in this section shall
be construed as limiting the rights of an injured party to maintain an action for
negligence whenever such a cause of 'action would otherwise exist." H.B. 700, 84th
Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 35(3) (1987). Not only is this provision redundant because
§ 35 is restricted by § 33 to strict products claims, but it begs the question as to how,'
in the future, a negligent marketing claim will differ from a strict liability claim to
the same effect. In Nesselrode the majority opinion had made a point of distinguishing
between negligence and strict liability based claims solely on the premise that, "[u]nder
the [negligence] theory, knowledge is a relevant consideration. But under the [strict
liability] theory, liability may be imposed without regard to the defendant's knowledge
or conduct." 707 S.W.2d at 383. This distinction appears difficult to maintain once
knowledge is admissible in the strict liability action. Another distinction that exists
and that survives the statutory reform is the way the court's focus differs under the
two theories. As the Supreme Court of California has remarked:
Arguably, the difference between negligence and strict liability standards in
this situation is the focus: in the first, the jury must determine the reason-
ableness of the manufacturer's conduct; in the second, the determination is
whether the product has been rendered defective because, applying an ob-
jective standard, and weighing the relevant costs and benefits, a warning
was required.
Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 700, 677 P.2d 1147, 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr.
870, 875 (1984); see also Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. 2d 26, -, 402
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Even in the case of marketing defects, that distinction remains in place with
regard to plaintiff's case. She does not bear the burden of proving that the
defendant had actual or constructive foresight of the risk of harm posed by
its product. Rather, a burden of proving scientific unknowability is allocated
to the manufacturer.
The legislation goes further, however, than a mere reversal of the post-
Elmore line of cases. While state of the art evidence is to be admissible, the
person asserting it shall have the burden of proof.20 Thus, if the proffering
of such evidence is offensive,20 2 plaintiff will have the same burden as be-
fore.2 0 3 If, as seems more likely, the evidence is proffered defensively or
counter-offensively,2 0 the burden of proof is allocated to the defendant.
More than a simple burden shift, however, this new statutory formulation
characterizes such evidence as establishing an affirmative defense. 20 5 As such,
it will have to be specifically pleaded by the defendant who will have to offer
an instruction to the same effect.Y
VI. REASONABLY ANTICIPATED USE
A. In General
Posing the question of whether a product is defective unreasonably dan-
gerous, without more, is to pose an essentially meaningless question. To
N.E.2d 194, 198 (1980).
A different distinction based upon the allocation of the burden of proof is
suggested infra text at note 201. Further, it appears that the Governor's Task Force
thought that the most important distinction remaining was that, under a negligence
theory, the plaintiff could bring action for failure to warn of a defect discovered
after manufacture and sale. See FINAL REPORT, supra note 197, at 382.
200. In strict liability (manufacturing and design defect) cases, the manufac-
turer's knowledge of the risk of harm has been held to be irrelevant. For Missouri
cases adopting this "constructive foresight" rule, see supra, text accompanying note
49.
201. H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 35(2) (1987). Thus, providing
a further distinction between a strict liability claim and one pursued using negligence
doctrine. Post-Beshada courts have adopted a similar approach through judicial de-
velopment. See Feldman v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, -, 479 A.2d 374, 388
(1984).
202. See generally supra note 168.
203. However, it is difficult to see how such offensive use of state of the art
could ever constitute an affirmative defense! See H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg.
Sess., § 35(2) (1987).
204. See, e.g., Adams v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., Nos. 85-2382, 85-2383 (8th Cir.
Dec. 1, 1986).
205. H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 35(2) (1987).
206. See generally MAI 3.01 for instruction on the burden of proof. As to the
specific defense defendant will have to offer an instruction to the effect that, for
example,
Your verdict must be for the defendant if you believe: At the time when
the [describe product] was placed in the stream of commerce the dangerous
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avoid the label "absolute liability," the defectiveness issue must not solely
depend upon the application of some decisional criteria.0° Additionally, such
criteria must be supplied with some context within which they may operate.
Thus, a product's legal defectiveness may only be judged within the context
of its utilization. This is doctrinally expressed as requiring a determination
whether the product in question is defective for its reasonably anticipated
(or foreseeable) use. 2 8 From the defendant's perspective, of course, any use
of the product which it did not intend should not involve exposure to liability.
Nevertheless, in Missouri, as in most other jurisdictions, it is well established
that "[t]he issue is not what use [the defendant] intended for its product but
what use of the product objectively was foreseeabe." Unfortunately, lurk-
ing beneath this essentially simple formulation are three difficult and over-
lapping concepts; foreseeable use simpliciter, product misuse, and foreseeable
user.
B. Foreseeable Use
The first of these issues to be confronted may be illustrated by the
paradigmatic foreseeable use question; "Was it foreseeable that this knife
would be used as a toothpick?" The obviousness of this example should not
207. See supra text accompanying note 78, (discussion of the nature of the
issue that should be left to the jury).
208. Obviously it is important to distinguish between the requirement of fore-
seeable use which is relevant in strict liability and foreseeable risk which, other than
in marketing cases, is not. See Phillips v. Kimwood Mach. Co., 269 Or. 485, 491-
97, 525 P.2d 1033, 1036-37 (1974); see also Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707
S.W.2d 371, 375 n.4 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess.,
§ 33(2) (1987) ("[Tihe product was used in a manner reasonably anticipated.").
209. Laney v. Coleman, 758 F.2d 1299, 1302 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying Missouri
law); see also Vanskike v. ACF Indus. Inc., 665 F.2d 188, 195 (8th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 1000 (1982); Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1200-
01 (8th Cir. 1973); Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, 723 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. 1987) (en banc);
Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602, 607-08 (Mo. 1977) (en banc); Keener
v. Dayton Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 365-66 (Mo. 1969); Higgins v. Paul
Hardeman, 457 S.W.2d 943, 948 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970); Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522
S.W.2d 632, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d
404, 414 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
This requirement of reasonably anticipated use was recognized as a component
of Missouri's negligence based products liability doctrine. See, e.g., White v. General
Chem. Co., 136 S.W.2d 345, 348, 350 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940); cf. H.B. 700, 84th Gen.
Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 36(3)[2] (1987), providing that, in the context of the defense
of comparative fault, "fault" chargeable to the plaintiff includes "[u]se of the product
for a purpose not intended by the manufacturer." However, this aspect of the new
comparative fault defense must be read subject to § 33(2) stating that reasonably
anticipated use is a requirement for strict products liability. Thus, the requirement
of reasonably anticipated use remains as part of plaintiff's burden. However, defend-
ant as an affirmative defense may allege the plaintiff's comparative fault, including
the foreseeable but unintended use of the product.
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cloud the importance of the inquiry. The question turns on the meaning
allocated to "foreseeable." At the very least, something is foreseeable if it
has occurred before or if someone of relevance predicted that it would oc-
cur. 210 It is these meanings of "foreseeable" that do much to occupy plain-
tiff's counsel during the discovery process2 and defendant's counsel during
the evidentiary phase of most trials. 212 As Judge Donnelly remarked in Nes-
selrode, "[o]rdinarily anticipated misuse would be shown by other incidents
of such misuse. None of the [witnesses] had ever heard of such an occur-
rence. '213 Nevertheless, the ease with which some courts can exhaust the
natural meanings of "foresight" provides an example of one cause of the
continued expansion of modern products liability law.
It has been stated that "foreseeability does not require that prior iden-
tical or even similar events must have occurred."2 14 Such an extended meaning
of (un)foreseeable is not really a "meaning" at all. It is the judicial appli-
cation of that term as a mere conclusory label for a decision already reached.21 5
Thus, judicial (or jury) determination that using a knife as a toothpick is
"unforeseeable" is nothing more than a convenient linguistic artifice ex-
210. This latter meaning would include the manufacturer's intended use. See,
e.g., Commercial Distrib. Center v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664, 670 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985); see also Jackson v. Ray Kruse Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 664 (Mo.
1986) (Higgins, C.J., concurring).
211. An interesting illustration of this issue came about in the pre-litigation
process in Virginia D. v. Madesco Inv. Corp., 648 S.W.2d 881 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
The issue in that case revolved around what types of criminal conduct should have
been foreseen by a hotel operator. As the case turned out the supreme court adopted
a wide characterization of foresight of criminal activities, effectively holding that
previous occurrence of some nonviolent criminal activity (e.g., theft and vandalism)
could cause a reasonable innkeeper to foresee a violent physical assault. Clearly,
however, the plaintiff, unaware of the supreme court's newly discovered disposition
to make such a general characterization, must have been most anxious to identify,
through the discovery process, previous events of this type (criminal sexual assaults).
Thus is explained the collateral skirmish reported sub nomine Tufts v. Madesco Inv.
Corp., 524 F. Supp. 484 (E.D. Mo. 1981) (Missouri law does not recognize a private
right of action for perjury).
212. Defense counsel will occupy herself trying to get the court to permit the
introduction of "state of the art" evidence. Specifically, evidence either that no one
else in this industry could have foreseen this danger ("scientific unknowability") or
that even if this danger was known, the industry as a whole had not reacted in the
way that plaintiff was arguing for (custom). For these and other meanings of "state
of the art," see supra text accomapanying note 169.
213. 707 S.W.2d at 391.
214. Becker v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213
(1985) (en banc) (Bird, C.J., concurring).
215. For a nice example of the way in which the judiciary may choose to
(de)emphasize different meanings of foreseeability consider a leading opinion dealing
with the duty of care in negligence cases. Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal.
3d, 49, 55-60, 665 P.2d 947, 950-53, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857, 860-63 (1983); cf. id. at -,
665 P.2d at 955, 192 Cal. Rptr. at - (Kroninger, J., dissenting).
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pressing a conclusion that, for various objective or subjective, logical or
emotional, experiential or speculative, political, psychic, social or economic
reasons, the losses attributable to this particular knife/toothpick/gum dam-
age will not be redistributed. 21 6
Consider, for example, Baker v. International Harvester Co. 217 Plain-
tiffs' decedent had been hunting from a combine when he fell off and was
subsequently run over by the machine. According to the comrt of appeals,
The use of the ladder by decedent while holding onto a gun, without
knowledge of such use by the combine operator, and at a time when the
combine was being used to harvest beans in a rural area, was a use by
decedent not intended nor anticipated by the manufacturer.28
This conclusion by the court was flung into the face of evidence adduced
at trial that the defendant's product safety engineer, a hunter, had personal
experience that people hunted from combines! 21 9
C. Product Misuse
In many contexts, the phrase "product misuse" is, itself, a conclusion.
The most common defense posture is, after all, to attempt to shift evidence
from the condition of its product to the conduct of the plaintiff. A defendant
who successfully argued to a jury, and a fortiori to the judge,210 that the
plaintiff's injuries arose from an unforeseeable use of the product often will
conclude (albeit erroneously2') that the court recognized some type of af-
firmative defense based on the plaintiff's conduct, rather than that the plain-
216. It should not be thought that the intricacies of foreseeable use occur only
in complex design cases. In Fitzgerald Marine Sales v. LeUnes, 659 S.W.2d 917 (Tex.
Ct. App. 1983), plaintiff had been thrown from a boat during a fishing trip. As he
was ejected, the boat's steering wheel, which he was holding onto, broke. The steering
wheel contained "voids" that reduced the strength of the wheel. The judgment of
the trial court was reversed on the basis that there was no evidence to suggest that
the steering wheel was unreasonably dangerous for its foreseeable use of steering as
opposed to the use to which it was actually put, as a restraint.
217. 660 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
218. Id. at 23.
219. Id. at 22. See also Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, 723 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. 1987)
(en banc), a manufacturing defect case, in which defendants suggested that a use
which they knew about and inadequately warned of was not a reasonably anticipated
use.
220. See, e.g., Baker v. International Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21, 23 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1983) (directed verdict for manufacturer on issue of foreseeable use).
221. See, e.g., Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 637 (Mo. Ct. App.
1975) ("'[A]bnormal use'. .. is not properly a defense but a necessary element of
plaintiff's cause of action."). See also Ellsworth v. Sherne Lingerie, 303 Md. 581,
589-600, 495 A.2d 348, 352-56 (1985). But cf. H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg.
Sess., § 36(3)[1]-[2] (1987) (establishing both unanticipated and unintended uses as
partial defenses).
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tiff failed to meet her burden that the product was defective unreasonably
dangerous for its reasonably foreseeable uses.22 Such confusion was under-
standable given the existence of the affirmative defense (in Missouri, the only
affirmative defense at common law223) of contributory fault. The confusion
occurs because many contributory fault cases seem to involve flagrant prod-
uct misuse.Y Such confusion also may be dangerous, because it is well
established that, under Missouri law, "even misuse may be foreseeable."22
A developing area of products liability doctrine involves the situation
where the conduct of the plaintiff is such that the court (all other things
being equal) would look favorably upon defendant's motion for directed
verdict on the basis that the use of the product was so bizarre as to be
"unforeseeable;" from the defendant's perspective, that the product had been
misused. The classic example would be where the plaintiff's decedent decided
to drive the defendant-manufactured motor vehicle at 150 miles per hour
down a narrow twisty road. Most courts would be tempted by defendant's
motion for directed verdict on the basis of unforeseeable use in such a case.
226
After all, this is not really the type of accident risk that the court would
want to redistribute to the manufacturer, not in the least because of the
grossly illegal speed involved.
Suppose, however, that the plaintiff has evidence that the manufacturer
advertised the vehicle in question by demonstrating it descending a hill at
150 miles per hour? In such a case, the court is not likely to grant defendant's
motion. Rather, it may view the defendant's self-serving promotion as ca-
pable of offsetting the plaintiff's unsafe conduct. Whereas defendants are
eager to claim that a "defense" of product "misuse" has been recognized,
here, plaintiffs will be eager to claim a victorious recognition of a "counter-
defense" of encouraged (or invited) misuse?227 In reality, of course, the plain-
222. In some jurisdictions there is a specific defense of product misuse; a form
of extreme and negligent, albeit foreseeable (mis)use.
223. Cf. H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 36 (1987).
224. See, e.g., Ensor v. Hodgeson, 615 S.W.2d 519, 525-26 (Mo. Ct. App.
1981).
225. Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co. 522 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975); see
also McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 672 F.2d 652, 661-62 (8th Cir. 1982); Hoppe
v. Midwest Conveyor Co., 485 F.2d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 1973); Nesselrode v. Ex-
ecutive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 381 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Baker v. International
Harvester Co., 660 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Higgins v. Hardeman, 457
S.W.2d 943 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
226. Clearly the motion could also be made on the basis that the plaintiff's
conduct was the sole proximate cause of her injuries (see infra text accompanying
note 247) or that the affirmative defense of contributory fault was applicable.
227. For cases purporting to apply the encouraged misuse doctrine see Fitzsim-
mons v. General Motors Corp., 24 ATLA L. REP. 290 (E.D. Ark. 1981)(settlement);
LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. La. 1978), aff'd,
623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980); see also Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67
Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981).
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tiff's attorney has merely proffered enough evidence to preserve the "rea-
sonably foreseeable use" issue for jury determination.
D. Foreseeable User
Not only is the product's foreseeable use relevant to the decision whether
it is defective unreasonably dangerous, but also the product's foreseeable
user. This is important for plaintiff and defendant alike. Consider, for ex-
ample, the question whether a well-written warning on the side of a bag of
insecticide is adequate to render a product non-defective. Clearly, if plain-
tiffs attorney is able to convince the court that non-English speaking farm-
workers were foreseeable users then the defendant will have little chance of
establishing the adequacy of the warning. 228
On the other hand, consider a case in which the defendant has failed
to place any warning on a dangerous product. If the defense can establish
that the only foreseeable users of the product already knew, or should have
known,229 of all the dangers that the defendant failed to warn about, then
the plaintiff will be hard pressed to establish that the product was defective
unreasonably dangerous for its foreseeable users.23 0
E. "Per Se" Rules
When one of these issues seems, in a sufficiently large number of cases,
to raise the question as to whether they will support a defendant's directed
verdict, it frequently attracts the inaccurate labelling of "defense." A recent
example is the attention granted to the so-called "sophisticated user"' z 1 de-
fense.
The adoption of such "per se" rules runs counter to the trend in modern
products liability. Most of these rules had their origins in warranty or even
pre-MacPherson 2 2 products law. Closely constructed sub-rules such as the
228. See Hubbard-Hall Chem. v. Silverman Co., 340 F.2d 402 (1st Cir. 1965).
229. See, e.g., Nesselrode, 707 S.W. 2d at 393 (Donnelly, J., dissenting); see
also Bean v. Ross Mfg., 344 S.W.2d 18 (Mo. 1961) (en banc); Grady v. American
Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911, 917 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985). A similar issue arises in
cases in which defendant is alleging that the plaintiff is particularly susceptible. See
Kehm v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying Iowa
law).
230. See infra notes 231-37, 280-87 and accompanying text.
231. See generally Comment, Duty to Warn and the Sophisticated User Defense
in Products Liability, 15 U. BALT. L. REv. 276, 285-307 (1986). For the defense
perspective, see St. Leger, Goggin & Brophy, supra note 153, at 1268-76. For the
plaintiff perspective, see Middleton & Shaffer, The Intermediary Defense in Toxic
Torts, TaIAL, November 1986, at 66.
232. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050
(1916) (retirement of so-called privity rule denying negligence cause of action between
manufacturer and ultimate consumer).
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"foreign-natural" ' 3 doctrine or "obvious danger"' ' rule 5 have not survived
the modern rush by courts toward doctrinal simplification? 6 and the creation,
seemingly wherever possible, of a jury issue. 37 The supreme court's recent
wholehearted endorsement of this approach argues against the adoption in
Missouri of any new "per se" rules.
VII. PROXIMATE CAUSATION
A. In General
As the Missouri Supreme Court has stated, "Proving proximate caus-
ation in a strict liability case is a fundamental burden that must be met."' ' 8
Clearly, the simple wording of Missouri's jury instruction, to the extent that
plaintiff must prove that she "was damaged as a direct result of such defective
condition"239 of the product, fails to express the intricacies of modern prod-
ucts liability causation doctrine.m Specifically, the instruction fails to ade-
quately take into account the complications that will arise when, for example,
a plaintiff is unable to identify the particular product manufacturer that
marketed the product in question, or where the defendant wishes to raise
233. See, e.g., Mix v. Ingersoll Candy Co., 6 Cal. 2d 674, 59 P.2d 144 (Cal.
1936)
234. Also known as the patent-latent rule.
235. See, e.g., Campo v. Scofield, 276 A.D. 413, 95 N.Y.S.2d 610, 95 N.E.2d
802 (1950).
236. See, e.g., Matthews v. Campbell Soup Co., 380 F. Supp. 1061 (S.D. Tex.
1974); Betethia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960) (removal
of foreign-natural distinction); Holm v. Sponco Mfg., 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982)
(abrogation of latent-patent rule). Needless to say, the mere abrogation of a "per
se" rule such as the obvious danger doctrine does not stop that factual issue from
arising in other contexts.
237. See, e.g., McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 672 F.2d 652 (8th Cir.
1982) (obviousness of danger, while not a total bar to recovery, was relevant to the
jury question as to plaintiff's contributory fault. Also holding that obvious and
apparent danger instruction was an inappropriate converse to Missouri's instruction
on defectiveness); see also Hylton v. John Deere Co., 802 F.2d 1011, 1015 (8th Cir.
1986); Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911, 916 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
238. Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, 707 S.W.2d 371, 381 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc).
239. MAI 25.04, 25.05.
240. See, e.g., Friedman v. General Motors Corp., 43 Ohio St. 2d 209, 216,
331 N.E.2d 702, 706 (1975) ("To sustain their allegations against [the defendants],
the plaintiffs were required to prove that the [product], manufactured and sold by
the defendant, was defective; that the defect existed at the time the product left the




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 52, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 7
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol52/iss1/7
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
for jury consideration the issue of the causal role in the accident played either
by the plaintiff or some third party.2 1
If Missouri continues to decrease the plaintiff's effective burden in prov-
ing that a product was defective unreasonably dangerous, then it is only to
be expected that there will be a corresponding increase in defense interest in
arguments based upon proximate causation.
B. Occurrence of the Injury
Notwithstanding such complications, the occasional case will still nurture
difficult questions of proof with regard to more mundane questions involving
the exact circumstances surrounding the injury. Plaintiff retains the burden
of proving that the defect that she has identified in the product2A2 was the
cause of the injury suffered.243 Consider, for example, a case in which the
plaintiff suffers a shock from an electric sign. The plaintiff's allegation is
that the sign was in a "defective condition, unreasonably dangerous" due
to a dearth of drain holes. Absent any evidence that there was water in the
sign at the time of the injury, the question whether the alleged defect caused
the injury should not be left to the jury.244
C. Temporal Causation
Missouri has stayed loyal to the Restatement position that liability will
not obtain unless the "[product] reach[ed] the user or consumer without
241. For some additional lroximate cause issues, specificallly, of the legal cause
variety, see Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and Strict Liability: The Odd Couple
of Tort Law, 8 RTrr.-C m. L. REv. 101, 119-25 (1976). See also Crankshaw v. Pied-
mont Driving Club, 115 Ga. App. 820, 156 S.E.2d 208 (1967); Oehler v. Davis, 223
Pa. Super. 333, 298 A.2d 895 (1972).
242. Either directly or through the utilization of circumstantial evidence. See
supra text accompanying note 104.
243. For a close case involving accident reconstruction, see Boy v. I.T.T. Grin-
nell Corp., 150 Ariz. 526, -, 724 P.2d 612, 614-15 (Ct. App. 1986). For the role
of expert testimony, see Keller v. International Harvester Corp., 648 S.W.2d 584,
591-92 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
244. Garret v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 631 S.W.2d 652, 653-54 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1982); see also Collins v. Goodrich Co., 558 F.2d 908, 912 (8th Cir. 1977);
Tucker v. Central Hardware Co., 463 S.W.2d 537 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Lifritz v.
Sears Roebuck & Co., 472 S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Buckner v. Pillsbury
Co., 661 S.W.2d 626 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Fahy v. Dresser Indus., No. 50783, (Mo.
Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1987) (insufficient evidence that alleged defect in asphalt roller
had caused injuries complained of); Bhagvandoss v. Beiersdorf, 723 S.W.2d 392 (Mo.
1987) (en banc); cf. Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 409 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983); Klein v. General Elec. Co., 714 S.W.2d 896, 900-01 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
1987]
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substantial change in the condition in which it [was] sold."' 245 This provision
relates to the proof of the existence of the factual defect24 6 at a given point
in time and the allocation of the burden on this issue to the plaintiff. As
such it guarantees a minimum contact point between the alleged defect and
the allegedly responsible defendant. The question whether or not a particular
modification to a product was foreseeable should not be relevant to this
threshold, and exclusively empirical, issue. 24 7 Rather, any question of fore-
seeable use should relate only to the legal defectiveness of the product. 24s
In manufacturing defect cases, 249 temporal causation issues will become
inextricably intermingled with the problem of proving the existence of a
factual defect in cases where the product in question was destroyed or badly
damaged.2 0
245. RESTATEMENT, supra note 19, § 402A(1)(b); see, e.g., McIntyre v. Everest
& Jennings, 575 F.2d 155, 157 (8th Cir. 1978); Lifritz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 472
S.W.2d 28, 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971); Winters v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 554 S.W.2d
565, 569-71 (Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Weatherford v. H.K. Porter, 560 S.W.2d 31, 35
(Mo. Ct. App. 1977); Williams v. Deere & Co., 598 S.W.2d 609, 612-13 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980); Williams v. Nuckolls, 644 S.W.2d 670, 673-74 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982);
Patterson v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 674 S.W.2d 599, 605-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984)
(Gaertner, P.J., concurring); Helm v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of St. Louis, 723
S.W.2d 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
246. Discussed supra text accompanying note 98.
247. See, e.g., Hill v. General Motors Corp., 637 S.W.2d 382 (Mo. Ct. App.
1982) (defect caused by plaintiff modification to vehicle not present at time product
left hands of manufacturer, therefore section 402A not applicable. Notwithstanding
foreseeability of such modifications, defendant owed no duty to warn under negli-
gence theory). See generally Cox v. General Motors, 514 S.W.2d 197 (Ky. 1974). See
also Robinson v. Reed-Prentice, 49 N.Y.2d 471, 480, 403 N.E.2d 440, 443, 426
N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1980) ("Principles of foreseeability, however, are inapposite where
a third party affirmatively abuses a product by consciously bypassing built-in safety
features.")
248. The key to these types of cases is to determine the factual defect allegation
that plaintiff is making. If that allegation is made by reference to the state of the
product at the time of the injury producing event, then defendant may demand that
plaintiff satisfies her temporal causation burden. Thus, the only issue would be the
factual/empirical questions involved in comparing the product at the time of the
injury with the product at the time of marketing. See, e.g., Corsetti v. Stone, 396
Mass. 1, -, 483 N.E. 2d 793, 806 (1985). In contrast, if the plaintiff is making
her factual defect allegation by reference to evidence as to the state of the product
at the time of marketing, then (by definition) she will have demonstrated temporal
causation. The more important issue that will arise in this type of case is whether
plaintiff has made her burden with regard to showing reasonably foreseeable use of
the product, in the sense that the misuse or subsequent alteration of the product
could have been anticipated. See, e.g., MacCuish v. Volkswagenwerk A.G., 22 Mass.
Ct. App. 380, -, 494 N.E.2d 390, 394 (1986). The issue of foreseeable use is
discussed supra, text at note 210.
249. Generally, this problem will not arise in design defect cases because, by
definition, there will be other examples of the product to examine for the existence
of defects.
250. See, e.g., Coulter v. Michelin Tire Corp., 622 S.W.2d 421 (Mo. Ct. App.
[Vol. 52
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D. Avoidance of Injury
The plaintiff's burden of proof extends beyond a mere showing that the
product's identified defect was responsible for the plaintiff's injury. Addi-
tionally, plaintiff must show that the product, if rendered safer, would have
avoided such injury. For example, in Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft
"Inc.,2' the defendant argued, inter alia, that the inclusion of additional
warnings in an aircraft repair manual would not have prevented the accident
that occurred. This argument was based on evidence that mechanics had
failed to read the manual in question. The Supreme Court of Missouri con-
cluded that "the evidence was sufficient to allow a jury to infer that had
[defendant] either affixed a warning to [the part of the aircraft involved],
placed a warning in the ... manual, or warned ... by way of a service
bulletin, [the aircraft owner] would have taken appropriate action....
Whereas some jurisdictions have adopted a specific modification to the bur-
den of proof in such cases, 253 it cannot be said that the Missouri courts have
resolved the matter. 25 4
In Racer v. Utterman,255 the Eastern District Court of Appeals stated
that "[ifn failure-to-warn cases generally, certainty that the existence of the
warning would have prevented the injury is not required. In the absence of
compelling evidence establishing that the absence of a warning did not cause
the injury the causation question becomes one for the jury.''256 However, in
Duke v. Gulf & Western Mfg. Co.,257 the Western District Court of Appeals
stated, "that a rebuttable presumption must arise that a warning would be
heeded." 25 8
1981); Webster v. Empiregas Inc., 648 S.W.2d 198, 200 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983);
McClanahan v. Deere & Co., 648 S.W.2d 222 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Fain v. GTE
Sylvania, 652 S.W.2d 163, 164-65 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Patterson v. Foster Forbes
Glass Co., 674 S.W.2d 599 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Helm v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co.,
723 S.W.2d 465 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
251. 707 S.W. 2d 371 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
252. Id at 385.
253. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Magro v. Ragsdale Bros., 721 S.W.2d 832, 834 (Tex.
1986).
254. Cf. Nesselrode, 707 S.W. 2d at 392 (Donnelly, J., dissenting) ("While a
presumption may exist that if a warning has been given, it will be heeded, that
presumption cannot stand in the face of positive proof that the directions given were
not heeded and that the parts' identifying numbers were not even noticed.").
255. 629 S.W.2d 387, 394 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied and appeal dis-
missed sub nom. Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982).
256. Apparently approved of by the supreme court in Jackson v. Ray Kruse
Constr. Co., 708 S.W.2d 664, 668 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
257. 660 S.W.2d 404, 419 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); cf. Grady v. American Optical
Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911, 918 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (Eastern district apparently ap-
proving both Racer and Duke).
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All that is certain, therefore, is that in cases alleging failure to warn2 9
plaintiffs will face less difficulty in satisfying the courts on this aspect of the
causation burden than in design or quality control cases.260
E. Identifying the Defendant
The difficulties faced by plaintiffs in identifying a particular product
manufacturer as potentially responsible for their injuries has been well illus-
trated by the DES261 cases.2 2 Responding to the inability of DES plaintiffs
to identify the particular manufacturer (out of more than 300) actually re-
sponsible for the drug ingested by that particular plaintiff, many courts
adopted the so called rule of market share liability developed by the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court.32
In Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., however, the Missouri Supreme Court refused
to adopt the market share liability approach, labelling it as unfair, unwork-
259. See, e.g., Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 861 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 865 (1975); McGowne v. Challenge-Cook Bros., 672
F.2d 652, 661-62 (8th Cir. 1982); Peterson v. Auto Wash Mfg. & Supply Co., 676
F.2d 949, 954 (8th Cir. 1982); Grady v. American Optical Corp., 702 S.W.2d 911
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
260. See, e.g., Fahy v. Dresser Indus., No. 50783 (Mo. Ct. App. Jan. 27, 1987)
(insufficient evidence that if a deadman switch had been installed on asphalt roller,
plaintiff's injuries would have been avoided).
261. Diethylstilbestrol; a synthetic estrogenic hormone first manufactured as a
miscarriage preventative in 1947.
262. The DES cases, together with the asbestos cases discussed in the context
of "state of the art," supra text accompanying note 149, furnish excellent examples
of the "edge" of modern products liability doctrine. The fact that many jurisdictions
have "developed" new doctrine to deal with the issues presented in those cases (e.g.,
market share, no "state of the art" defense) has prompted praise in some quarters
for the ability of the common law to develop/demonstrate its flexibility and adapt-
ability. Consider, for example, some of the issues raised in Celotex Corp. v. Copeland,
471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985) and cases and articles cited therein.
An alternative "world view" might point to the impotence of our redistributive
systems to deal with the so.-called mass disaster type injuries, such as DES, asbestosis,
and the like. Rather than admit defeat, the courts have embarked on convoluted
"band-aid" escapades in an attempt to redistribute these types of risks. In the case
of DES injuries, our courts have introduced new products doctrine (e.g., the "market-
share" theory considered infra text accompanying note 263) and perverted aspects of
the intentional tort doctrine (e.g., Mink v. University of Chicago, 460 F. Supp. 713
(N.D. Ill. 1978)). In the case of asbestosis, courts unwilling to extend products liability
doctrine nevertheless may be tempted to redistribute such risks through other chan-
nels. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litigation, 509 A.2d 1116 (Del. Super. Ct. 1986).
The problem with this doctrinal "stretching" is how to restrict it on a "case-
by-case" basis without making the whole system look very silly. See, e.g., Feldman
v. Lederle Labs., 97 N.J. 429, -, 479 A.2d 374, 388 (1984).
263. Sindell v. Abbott. Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 607 P.2d 924, 163 Cal. Rptr.
132, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980).
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able, and contrary to Missouri law, as well as unsound public policy.264
Missouri has not been alone in resisting the market share approach. 265 Never-
theless, the court's rationale in Zafft is worthy of fiote:
This Court acknowledges and respects the compelling reasons motivating
the trial court and courts of other states to resolve the dilemma presented
in these cases by straining existing law or adopting novel theories. Plain-
tiffs are innocent and claim serious injuries alleged to result from their
mothers' use of DES. Yet simply to state, as have courts ruling in favor
of plaintiffs, that as between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defend-
ants, the latter should bear the cost of the injury, and that defendants
can better absorb this cost, ignores strong countervailing considerations.2"
In contrast, however, two years later in Nesselrode v. Executive Beech-
craft Inc., a similarly constituted court267 was to espouse a quite radical
rationale system of loss redistribution. 268 Nevertheless, there is no sign that
Zafft will be reconsidered. Absent any such special assistance from adven-
turous doctrine, the plaintiff will have to continue to build her case from
available evidence as to the identity of the manufacturer. 269
F. Intervening Cause
A defendant will raise the issue of intervening (or superseding) causation
in at least two situations. 270 First, it will arise where defendant wishes to
emphasize before the jury the conduct of the plaintiff. Second, it will be
present where the defendant wishes to urge jury consideration of the role of
a third party. Under modern Missouri law, there is heightened defense interest
in the supervening cause argument in these circumstances.
The reason for this is that Missouri effectively has denied the defense
of other, arguably more appropriate, avenues by which to pursue these issues.
For example, the defendant will have an interest in raising a supervening
264. 676 S.W.2d 241, 246 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
265. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Copeland, 471 So. 2d 533 (Fla. 1985); Mulcahy
v. Eli Lilly & Co., 386 N.W.2d 67 (Iowa 1986); see also Griffin v. Tenneco Resins,
648 F. Supp. 964, 966 (W.D.N.C. 1986) (appplying law of North Carolina) (describing
proposed theories for recovery as, inter alia, "exotic").
266. 676 S.W.2d at 246 (citations omitted).
267. By 1986, Judge Robertson had replaced Judge Gunn.
268. 707 S.W.2d 371, 383 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
269. See, e.g., Patterson v. Foster Forbes Glass Co., 674 S.W.2d 599, 602
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Helm v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 723 S.W.2d 465, 468 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1986).
270. Compare those cases in which the defendant is alleging that he owes no
duty to warn the plaintiff class, but only some intermediate distributor class in order
to make the product reasonably safe. See, e.g., Rusin v. Glendale Optical Co., 805
F.2d 650 (6th Cir. 1986).
This is in effect the "sophisticated user" argument dealt with supra note 231.
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cause issue in situations where plaintiff's conduct has not descended to suf-
ficient depths to trigger application of the "contributory fault" affirmative
defense. 271 Similarly, other than under the guise of a supervening cause ar-
gument, Missouri law does not permit the issue of an employer's contribution
of an employee's product related injury to be litigated. 27 2
Under Missouri law it is quite clear that "[t]he defendant is entitled to
argue that the product contains sufficient safety devices so that it is not
unreasonably dangerous and also that the alleged defects did not cause the
accident.' 273 Furthermore, in Nesselrode, the Missouri Supreme Court ac-
knowledged that "proximate cause has been recognized as a conceptual means
of limiting the scope of liability in a strict tort liability action. 2 74
271. Cf.. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc) ("the defendant may sometimes make use of the plaintiff's alleged carelessness
in support of arguments that the product is not unreasonably dangerous, or that the
alleged defects did not cause the injury ... ."). Cf. H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st
Reg. Sess., § 36 (1987).
272. See infra text accompanying note 277; see also Murphy v. L & J Press
Corp., 558 F.2d 407, 411-12 (8th Cir. 1977) (reversible error in admitting workplace
regulations because this had effect of transforming "feasibility" issue into "who had
the duty to guard?" issue), modified on other grounds, 577 F.2d 27 (8th Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978); cf. Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 666
F.2d 1223, 1226-27 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Minnesota law).
273. Barnes v. Tools & Mach. Builders, 715 S.W.2d 518, 522 (Mo. 1986) (en
banc) (emphasis added); see also Love v. Deere & Co., 684 S.W.2d 70, 75 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985) (defendant alleged that accident occurred, "not because of design
defect, but because of amateur, home workshop repair.").
274. 707 S.W.2d at 381.
For an example of the type of limiting instruction that is permitted in federal
district court applying Missouri law, consider-the following instruction which was
permitted in Chohlis v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 760 F.2d 901, 904 (8th Cir. 1985):
You are instructed that your verdict must be for defendant ... if you believe
that [the] airplane crashed, not because of any defective condition of the
airplane, but because [the pilot] failed to follow the placard checklist and
owner's manual and failed to switch to his main gas tanks before landing,
and ran his auxiliary tanks dry.
Id.
It should be noted, however, that the giving of such an instruction is probably
conditioned upon accompanying it with an instruction to the effect that:
More than one person may be to blame for causing an injury. If you decide
the defendant sold a dangerously defective product resulting in the death of
[plaintiff], it is not a defense that some person that is not a party to this
suit may also have been to blame.
Id.; cf. Lippard v. Houdaille Indus., 715 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Mo. 1986) (en banc):
The defendant may sometimes make use of the plaintiff's alleged carelessness
in support of arguments that the product is not unreasonably dangerous, or
that the alleged defects in a product did not cause the injury, but these are
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The real problem with the superseding causation argument in modern
products liability law is that "fin a strict tort liability case, proximate cause
enters through a number of different doors. Underneath the conceptual um-
brella of proximate cause can be found the concepts of misuse, abnormal
use, reasonably anticipated use, and contributory fault." 275 The second prob-
lem with the supervening causation argument is "[u]nder established prin-
ciples of causation, the proximate cause of an event or injury need only be
a substantial factor or efficient causal agent." 276
Consider a typical supervening cause case involving, for example, an
employee injured at the work place allegedly because of the negligence of
her employer, as well as because of the defendant manufacturer's defective
unreasonably dangerous product. Plaintiff will object to the admissibility of
evidence concerning the conduct of the employer in such a case on the basis
of irrelevancy and prejudice. 277 However, since defendant is entitled to argue
the issue of supervening cause to the jury, such evidence should be admit-
ted.278 Indeed, in some circumstances, such superseding cause evidence might
be sufficient to sustain a directed verdict in favor of the defendant. 279
G. Intervening Cause and Foreseeable Use
The main bar to any wider utilization of the principles of intervening
causation in modern products law is the burgeoning scope of the foreseeable
use doctrine.280 The relationship between these two doctrinal constructs may
be analogized to the relationship between two negligence concepts; the duty
of care and proximate causation. Consider, for example, an accident in which
a drunk driver crashes into a telephone booth occupied by the plaintiff.
Plaintiff brings suit against the installers of the phone booth, alleging neg-
ligence in the choice of its location.281 Defendants answer with a motion for
summary judgment on the basis that, under the circumstances as alleged,
defendants owed plaintiff no duty of care. If this motion is denied then,
almost by definition, likewise are some of defendants potential intervening
275. Nesselrode, 707 S.W. 2d at 381.
276. Id.
277. FED. R. EviD. 402 (relevancy); and id. 403 (prejudicial).
278. See, e.g., Gross v. Black & Decker (U.S.) Inc., 695 F.2d 858, 861-63 (5th
Cir. 1983) (applying Texas law).
279. See Kirsch v. Picker Int'l, 753 F.2d. 670, 671-72 (8th Cir. 1985) (applying
Missouri law; directed verdict for defendant X-ray machine manufacturer because
failure to warn physician of attendant risks was not the proximate cause of the
patient's injuries as physician already aware of those risks), reh'g denied, 760 F.2d
183 (8th Cir. 1985); see also Strong v. E.I. duPont de Nemours Co., 667 F.2d 682,
688 (8th Cir. 1981) (applying Nebraska law).
280. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
281. The hypothetical is based on Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 34 Cal.
3d 49, 665 P.2d 957, 192 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1983).
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cause arguments. For example, if the court was to hold that defendant owed
such a duty with regard to the location of the phone booth, that should also
serve to deal with any defense argument that the drunk driver colliding with
the booth was an intervening cause. Thus, like a voracious character from
some video game, the duty issue consumes the intervening cause issue.
A similar dynamic may be seen in the operation of the intervening cause
and foreseeable use doctrines in products liability. Thus, if the court deter-
mines that, for example, an alteration of a product by a third party2 2 or the
misuse of the product by the plaintifP83 was a foreseeable use,2M no question
of intervening cause may arise as a bar at a later stage. 2 5 As the court of
appeals has stated in a case in which defendant sought to establish a chain
of unanticipated use:
An intervening resulting cause is a new and independent force which so
interrupts the chain of events initiated by defendant's negligence as to
become the responsible, direct, proximate cause of the injury. The first
cause becomes the remote cause and the intervening cause the proximate
cause only when the chain of events is so broken that the result is no
longer the natural and probable consequence of the primary cause or one
which ought to have been anticipated.2 6
Furthermore, as the Eighth Circuit has concluded with regard to a warn-
ing allegation:
In this case the alleged intervening cause...was precisely the event against
which [defendant] warned in its safety literature. It does not matter that
the exact manner in which the [injury causing event] occurred was not
foreseen. [Defendant] cannot argue that, as a matter of law, the precise
danger which it contemplated was unforeseen.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Clearly, some trends in the recent development of Missouri products
liability law are detectable. In general, it would appear that the supreme
court has accepted the responsibility of determining the development of prod-
282. See, e.g., Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 414 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1983).
283. See, e.g., Jarrell v. Fort Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828, 836
(Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
284. In practice, of course, the court probably will content itself with a de-
termination that the question of foreseeable use discloses a jury issue.
285. This remains true with regard to third party acts and omissions. However,
H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 36 (1987) does affect the situation where
plaintiff is at fault.
286. Love v. Deere & Co., 684 S.W.2d 70, 75 (Mo. Ct. Appp. 1985).
287. Griggs v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 513 F.2d 851, 862 (8th Cir. 1975).
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ucts law. Missouri products liability law has not eschewed the doctrinal base-
line provided for so many years by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Rather
the supreme court has set out to "purify" section 402A; to give section 402A
what the court perceives as its full force as a strict liability doctrine.
The current attitudes displayed by the prevailing majority of the supreme
court suggest that many issues previously left in the hands of the trial judge
will, henceforth, be considered appropriate for jury determination.
To some, this in itself may reek of a pro plaintiff bias. However, it can
hardly be considered revolutionary. Neither can it be considered particularly
fashionable. Today, partly as a response to the insurance "crisis," much
attention is being directed to the "re-doctrinalization" of tort law. The avowed
purpose of this trend is to further consistency and predictability by providing
the judiciary, once again, with the plethora of jury control devices that they
once enjoyed.
In Missouri this trend, appparently accompanied by internal strife on
the supreme court, has been ignored. Nevertheless, in matters that go beyond
the core interpretation that should be placed on section 402A of the Res-
tatement, the Missouri Supreme Court and its obedient appellate courts seem
as conservative as ever in their responses. There has been no adoption of
exotic doctrine. 218 Otherwise deserving plaintiffs will still face summary judg-
ment when they are unable to identify the specific product supplier respon-
sible for their injuries. 2 9 Successor corporations will be immune from liability
based upon any "product-line" theory.29° Products liability doctrine will not
be permitted to trespass any further on the territory of the contract lawyers .29
288. See supra note 265.
289. Zafft v. Eli Lilly & Co., 676 S.W.2d 241 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
290. Young v. Fulton Iron Works Co., 709 S.W.2d 927, 940 (Mo. Ct. App.
1986). See generally Aylward & Aylward, Successor Liability for Defective Products-
Misplaced Responsibility, 13 STETSoN L. REV. 555 (1984); Schulman, Commentary:
Successor Corporation Liability and the Inadequacy of the Product Line Continuity
Approach, 31 WAYNE L. REv. 135 (1984). See also Green, Successor Liability: The
Superiority of Statutory Reform to Protect Products Liability Claimants, 72 COiRELL
L. REv. 17 (1986)
291. See Sharp Bros. Contracting Co. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703
S.W.2d 901, 903 (Mo. 1986) (en banc) (Welliver, J., concurring) ("when commercial
parties of equal bargaining power enter into a contract which either expressly allocates
the risk or by omission is allocated under the terms of the Uniform Commercial
Code, the policy behind strict liability does not apply. Either the contract or the
U.C.C. governs the allocation of risk.") (citation omitted); see also R.W. Murray
Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 697 F.2d 818 (8th Cir. 1983); City of Clayton v.
Grumman Emergency Prods., 576 F. Supp. 1122 (E.D. Mo. 1983); Aronson's Men's
Stores, 632 S.W.2d 472 (Mo. 1982) (en banc). See generally Note, Privity Revisited:
Tort Recovery by a Commercial Buyer for a Defective Product's Self-Inflicted Dam-
age, 84 MIcH. L. REv. 517 (1985).
Additionally, Missouri remains an unlikely candidate for any extension of
strict liability into the landlord-tenant relationship. See, e.g., Chubb Group of Ins.
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Missouri, and its supreme court, have remained true to the basic decision
to redistribute most of the risks associated with defective products to the
manufacturers of those products. This redistribution decision is in the process
of reaffirmation by an often bitterly divided Missouri Supreme Court. Yet
there is no revolution in progress. There has been no violent abandonment
of the old approaches. This is particularly the case when recent and much
maligned judicial developments are compared with reforms that now have
emanated from elsewhere in the state capitol. If there is a criticism that can
be levelled at the supreme court, it relates to a discernible over-eagerness to
permit cases to go to the jury and an apparent disinterest in the administrative
costs thereby imposed. It is ironic that Missouri's reform legislation, by
apparently encouraging defendants to "try" the plaintiff's conduct in every
case, 29 " may have a similar impact.
Cos. v. C.F. Murphy & Assocs., 656 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). Cf. Becker
v. IRM Corp., 38 Cal. 3d 454, 698 P.2d 116, 213 Cal. Rptr. 213 (1985) (en bane).
For an excellent discussion of the Becker case, see Note, Let the Landlord Beware:
California Imposes Strict Liability on Lessor of Rental Housing, 51 Mo. LAW REv.
899 (1986). Of course, the situation will be different where a product is involved and
the premises merely form a backdrop to the proceedings. See Gabbard v. Stephenson's
Orchard, 565 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978).
292. See, e.g., H.B. 700, 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess., § 36 (1987).
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